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ABSTRACT
“An Exercise in International Extortion”:
Operation “Intercept” and Nixon’s 1969 War on Drugs
by Justin M. Reid
When the former senator and vice president assumed the Oval Office in January 1969,
President Richard M. Nixon inherited a nation in crisis with drugs playing a central role. At a
campaign stop a few months earlier, Nixon announced to a packed convention center in
Anaheim, CA, that if elected president he would end the flow of the illicit drugs coming into the
United States “decimating a generation of young Americans.”
True to his word, Nixon moved aggressively after his election victory to refocus the federal
drug enforcement bureaucracy on drug source control, blaming Mexico as the main culprit. On
September 21, 1969, Nixon officials launched Operation “Intercept”, a drug enforcement scheme
sending two thousand U.S. Customs agents to execute a zero-tolerance inspection policy at the
U.S.-Mexico border. Wreaking havoc on border economies for nearly a month and failing to
produce any notable drug seizures, “Intercept” nonetheless succeeded, in the administration’s
view, by compelling the Mexican government to sign Operation “Cooperation”, an antitrafficking agreement that laid the groundwork for future U.S. bilateral and multilateral
agreements on drugs throughout the region.
Operation “Intercept” and the Nixon administration’s perceived diplomatic success of
unilateral coercion—an enforcement tactic in kind with his campaign pledge to restore “law and
order”—formed the proof-of-concept for the drug supply control ideology that has underpinned
U.S. illicit narcotics strategy in Latin America for more than half a century. Nixon’s failure to

v

craft a sustainable diplomatic solution with Mexico at the inception of the “drug war” explains in
part why outcomes for the U.S. antinarcotics efforts have fallen well short of their goals of
reducing illicit drug use and related crimes in the United States.
By redefining the drug problem as a “foreign danger,” the Nixon administration also linked
drug supply control ideology with anticommunist concepts of containment, international
development, and national identity that hewed more closely to Cold War policy aims than
previously understood. Within Latin America, Nixon’s Operation “Intercept” birthed a narcodogma that has overshadowed the region’s diplomatic relations with the United States and often
resulted in fatal consequences for many on both sides of the border.
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Introduction
After the United States invaded Mexico in 1846 to carry out what one scholar termed “an
act of expansionist aggression” on its southern neighbor, late nineteenth-century Mexican
president Porfirio Diaz quipped sardonically: “Mexico . . . so far from God, so close to the
United States.”1 His statement clearly elucidated the feeling of many Mexicans about their
relationship with their northern neighbor.
Nearly a century later, another Mexican president with the surname Diaz likely found
resonance in his predecessor’s observation about El Norte. In the fall of 1969, newly elected
U.S. President Richard M. Nixon met with Mexican President Gustavo Diaz Ordáz to inaugurate
the recently constructed Amistad Dam on the Rio Grande River and celebrate the two countries’
mutual friendship. Yet only a month later, the Nixon administration launched Operation
“Intercept”, an aggressive, unilateral drug interdiction plan that wreaked havoc on the U.S.Mexico border and severely damaged U.S.-Mexican relations. While the former President Diaz
lamented the fate of Mexico in the aftermath of a disastrous war with the United States, at the
close of the 1960s Diaz Ordáz bore witness to the opening salvo in a new kind of war, one that
shaped Mexico’s future irrevocably: the war on drugs.2

1

Amy S. Greenberg, A Wicked War: Polk, Clay, Lincoln and the 1846 U.S. Invasion of Mexico, (New York: Alfred
K Knopf Press, 2012). 1; Although a record of this quote cannot be directly attributed to President Porfirio Diaz,
Mexican literary tradition maintains Diaz as the originator. In a televised interview in 2021, Mexican President
Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador cited Diaz when he recited the same quote.
2
Interpretations of the term “war on drugs” abound as semantics around illicit drugs have evolved. As defined, the
terms “drug” and “narcotic” both fail to capture the full range of controlled psychoactive substances while also
lumping in legal ones. For simplicity, this paper will use the terms “drug(s)” and “war on drugs” to refer to U.S.
policy on illicit psychoactive substances in force during and after the Nixon administration. Although Ronald
Reagan is the first U.S. president to publicly use the exact words “war on drugs,” Richard Nixon is widely
considered the first to implement a war on drugs-style foreign policy in his 1971 speech to Congress (Richard
Nixon, “Special Message to Congress on Drug Abuse Prevention and Control,” June 17, 1971, American Presidency
Project, UC–Santa Barbara, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/special-message-the-congress-drug-abuseprevention-and-control) as the concept is generally understood within scholarship and the public discourse.
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In hindsight, however, Nixon’s seemingly incongruous about-face with Mexico has
coherence. Only a year earlier at a campaign rally a few miles from his boyhood home, the lawand-order candidate on the Republican 1968 presidential ticket named the culprit responsible for
America’s problems: illegal drugs coming from Mexico. On September 16th of that year, the
former senator and vice president announced to a crowded convention center in Anaheim,
California that if elected, he would stop illicit drugs coming into the United States that were
“decimating a generation of young Americans.”3 After a comfortable electoral victory two
months later, Nixon’s Anaheim speech would form the basis for the president’s war on drugs, a
policy framework that defined the Nixon legacy and decades of American interventionism
abroad.
True to his campaign pledge, during the administration’s first hundred days in office
Nixon convened a Special Presidential Task Force Relating to Narcotics, Marijuana, and
Dangerous Drugs in April 1969. He instructed the committee chairs to focus on curbing drug
trafficking into the United States, especially marijuana. The final report quoted Nixon’s 1968
speech when it aimed to “move against the source of drugs” outside U.S. borders, proposing
aggressive action towards one of the U.S.’s closest allies, Mexico.4
In September of Nixon’s first year in office, the White House took the Task Force’s
recommendations and devised Operation “Intercept”, a drug interdiction plan that mobilized
thousands of U.S. customs agents and executed a zero-tolerance inspection policy at the U.S.Mexico border. Nixon sought swift action to curb illicit drug use to fulfill his law-and-order

3

Bill Boyarski, “Nixon Pledges Drive to Cut Dope Traffic,” San Bernardino County Sun Times, Volume 75,
Number 11, 17 September 1968, https://www.newspapers.com/image/61409312/.
4
“Task Force Report”, June 18, 1969, National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files:
Staff Members and Office Files Egil Krogh, Box 30, "Operation “Intercept”,"
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB86/Intercept01.pdf

2

campaign promise. Skeptical of what he viewed as overly deferential State Department, Nixon
also pursued his own revisioning of U.S.-Latin America policy during his first year as president.5
Opposed by both the U.S. Ambassador to Mexico, Robert McBride, and the Office of
Management and Budget, Nixon and his top aides ignored interagency guidance and forged
ahead with “Intercept” without prior notice to the Mexican government. Within days, total
inspections caused massive delays at the land ports of entry and sparked trade disruptions on
both sides of the border.6
For nearly a month, commerce and travel gridlocked. Reduced cross-border traffic
sparked a dramatic, though short-lived, economic panic for the border economies. Ultimately,
Nixon’s aides relented only after an outcry from the business community and threats of
reciprocal inspections by Mexican officials on southbound border traffic forced their hand, and
“Intercept” quietly shut down a few weeks later.7
Nixon insisted on decisive action from Mexico to curb illegal drugs infiltrating its
southern border, and his Operation “Intercept” gambit demonstrated unequivocally that the
president would take any means necessary, even a partial economic blockade, to achieve his
goal. The opening act of a new drug war, “Intercept” introduced a foreign policy framework that
defined Nixon’s presidency and long outlived it.
Yet, illicit narcotics availability and drug trafficking remain as pervasive and destructive
now as in Nixon’s day.8 The drug war, supercharged under President Ronald Reagan and

5

Viron Vaky, “Memorandum of Conversation,” to Henry Kissinger, Camp David, September 27, 1969: Box 83;
NSC: Name File; Folder: Governor Rockefeller, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, hereafter RNPL.
6
Associated Press, “Tempers Flare Around Border,” San Bernardino County Sun, September 23, 1969,
https://www.newspapers.com/image/61460626.
7
Felix Belair Jr., “U. S. Bows to Mexican Demands,” The New York Times, October 11, 1969,
https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1969/10/11/83781861.html
8
For U.S. drug policy towards Latin America, see Ted Galen Carpenter, Bad Neighbor Policy: Washington’s Futile
War on Drugs in Latin America, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 8-12.; On issues of mass incarceration, see
Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness (New York: New Press,
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sustained by Democrats and Republicans alike, remains the U.S. federal government’s de facto
policy for curbing illicit narcotics abuse and distribution well into the 21st century. Decades of
ever-expanding drug war policy has disproportionately affected minority groups and the
disenfranchised, both domestically and abroad. Fifty years on, Nixon’s drug war continues with
many characterizing it as a failure.9
Though widely panned as a drug interdiction debacle, “Intercept” accomplished,
according to top Nixon aide G. Gordon Liddy, exactly the administration’s intent. “It was an
exercise in international extortion, pure, simple, and effective, designed to bend Mexico to our
will,” he stated.10 In October 1969, the United States and Mexico’s turned “Intercept” into
Operation “Cooperation”, an anti-trafficking agreement that laid the groundwork for the crop
eradication techniques and U.S. antidrug aid programs that would provide equipment and
training to host country law enforcement. This agreement would later inform future U.S.
bilateral and multilateral agreements on drugs throughout the region.
Ultimately, Operation “Intercept” and the Nixon administration’s tactic of unilateral
coercion—a practice corresponding with the President’s law-and-order platform—formed the
proof-of-concept for a drug war ideology that reframed Washington’s globalized illicit narcotics
policy strategy. Nixon’s decision to portray American drug abuse as a mostly foreign and not

2012), 9.; for Ed Vulliamy, “Nixon's 'war on drugs' began 40 years ago, and the battle is still raging,” The Guardian,
23 Jul 2011, https://www.theguardian.com/society/2011/jul/24/war-on-drugs-40-years; President Jimmy Carter,
“Call Off the Global Drug War,” The New York Times, June 16, 2011,
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/17/opinion/17carter.html
9
See Matthew R. Pembleton, Containing Addiction: The Federal Bureau of Narcotics and the Origins of America's
Global Drug War, (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2017). muse.jhu.edu/book/59551; David
Courtwright, Forces of Habit: Drugs and the Making of the Modern World (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
2002); and Kathleen J Frydl, The Drug Wars in America, 1940-1973, (New York: Cambridge University Press,
2013), 423.
10
Johan Hari, “My Interview with G. Gordon Liddy,” The Huffington Post, November 13, 2008,
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/my-interview-with-g-gordo_b_134364
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domestic problem fundamentally affected both the U.S. public health and foreign policy response
to the drug problem.
Operations “Intercept” and “Cooperation” also demonstrate how the language of warfare
empowered a transactional foreign policy on narcotics dominated by domestic political concerns.
This new drug foreign policy metastasized Nixon’s political prerogatives into an enduring
national security ethos that once fully embedded within the federal bureaucracy, extended well
beyond its original scope. For U.S. neighbors to the south, Nixon’s “Intercept” birthed a narcodogma that has overshadowed U.S-Latin American relations for more than half a century, with
often fatal consequences for many on both sides of the border.

5

Historiography
To analyze Operation “Intercept” and the foreign policy of Nixon’s drug war with
Mexico this thesis examines three main contextual areas though the lens of historical scholarship.
First, within any policy discussion of drug control during the Nixon administrations the Cold
War context looms large. Cold War theories of containment and international development all
intertwined in critical ways with the source control ideology in the early days of the drug war.
Secondly, addressing how Nixon shifted the paradigm of U.S. drug foreign policy
requires a brief overview of the evolution of drug regulation and enforcement in the United
States after the Second World War. In particular, the U.S. government’s drug enforcement
strategies under the past incarnations of the federal drug bureaucracy, the Federal Bureau of
Narcotics (FBN) and the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD), help interpret both
the legislative and executive actions taken under Nixon to address the drug problem.
Lastly, as Nixon’s Anaheim speech demonstrates, the societal and political tumult of the
1960s and early 1970s inflected greatly upon how U.S. government leaders responded to public
concern towards drug use and abuse during this formative period in the history of drug control in
the United States. A brief overview of the socio-political landscape leading up to the 1968
election places Nixon’s Operation “Intercept” in the cultural context of the time, and sheds light
on administration officials’ intentions when they found political expediency to effectively shut
down the U.S.-Mexico border to fight the drug war.
Acknowledging the new drug history of recent years, this paper tells the stories of
Operation “Intercept” and Nixon’s war on drugs through a war and society prism that broadens
the contextual discussion beyond policy debates and government leadership. Examining the
terminology and linguistic concepts that underpin the semantic frameworks of illegal drugs

6

merits scrutiny. Specifically, how should a “war on drugs” be defined? As scholars have
pointed out, government actions to enforce the prohibition or regulation of illicit drugs cannot
neatly fit into any accepted definition of war.
Against the standard Clausewitz definition used by military strategists, without a defined
enemy or clear political objective, a “war on drugs” stretches the etymological boundaries
between law enforcement activity and organized armed conflict between political entities.11
Literary historian James Dawes argues that even though words can be the antidote to human
conflict, the language of public discourse often functions as an extension of violence itself.12
That Nixon and other policymakers chose to consistently and intentionally use the language of
warfare and violence when defining the campaign against illicit drugs speaks to both the
ideological framework of the time, and the stakes of drug war itself.
For decades, FBN officials had long viewed their agency’s role as clandestine warfare on
drug production and trafficking. In the early Cold War, FBN law enforcement officials made
arrests, conducted raids, and sabotaged organized drug crime networks in countries throughout
Europe, the Middle East and Africa during the 1950 and 60s.13
Nixon’s rhetoric, however, elevated the war on drugs from federal government black ops
to acceptable public policy. Particularly in the U.S. context, a war implies a conflict far from
home with a tangible and fearsome enemy. Declaring war on drugs, i.e. war on a commodity
without agency, requires an intellectual leap that speaks both the contemporary context of Cold
War America and the nature of American political identity. Like America’s war against an

11

Carl von Clausewitz, On War, eds. Michael Eliot Howard and Peter Paret, (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2008). https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400837403.
12
James Dawes, The Language of War: Literature and Culture in the U.S. from the Civil War through World War
II, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2002).
13
Pembleton, Containing Addiction, 3.
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amorphously defined enemy of “international communism” during the 20th century, and the war
on terror during the 21st century, declaring war against an intractable enemy requires a similar
intellectual leap. As Matthew Pembleton points out, a war on drugs offers political utility as it
can “blur the lines around conventional conflict while using a strong metaphor to pit the United
States against an intangible.”14
In utilizing the language of war, therefore, political leaders and officials agitate for public
support – often through fear – and mobilize military resources to meet political aims. Mary
Dudziak discusses this conceptual pivot when she critiques societal acquiescence to the
expansion of government power during War Time (2012). Inherently, wartime is “an idea, rather
than an inevitable feature of our world,” Dudziak argues.15 Perhaps more than any other war in
recent memory, the war on drugs has persevered through successive administrations both as an
idea and as a physical reality. As noted in Drugs and Democracy in Latin America (2005), in
Mexico the empowerment of military jurisdiction over drug enforcement – with the U.S.’s
encouragement – has resulted in an increase in human rights abuses and political corruption, both
of which hinder democratic reforms. In only the past decade, more than 39,000 corpses remain
unidentified victims of governments’ U.S.-aided drug war in Mexico, evidence, the book
describes, of how “the metaphorical “war on drugs” became an all too real battlefield” for
countries caught in the drug war’s crosshairs.16

14

Ibid, 7.
Mary Dudziak, War Time: An Idea, Its History, and Its Consequences, (New York: Oxford University Press,
2012), 135.
16
Coletta Youngers and Eileen Rosin, eds, Drugs and Democracy in Latin America: The Impact of U.S. Policy,
(Boulder, CO: Lynne Reiner Publishers, 2005), 3, 294-96; Statistics quoted from David Agren, “Mexico's Drug War
Leaves 39,000 Unidentified Bodies in Its Morgues,” The Guardian, Guardian News and Media, 22 Sept. 2020,
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/sep/22/mexicos-drug-war-leaves-39000-unidentified-bodies-in-itsmorgues.
15
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Nixon’s Drug Policy and the Cold War
When historians assess the foreign policy legacy of President Richard Nixon, the Cold
War looms large. Pivotal events like normalizing relations with China, the nuclear arms
reduction treaty with the Soviet Union, or the end of the war in Vietnam top the list of Nixon’s
important achievements.17 Yet years before the Shanghai Communique, SALT, or the end of the
draft, Nixon’s first year in office focused considerable energy on a foreign policy issue much
closer to home: illegal drugs coming from Mexico.
Recent scholarship has taken a broader view of the evolution of U.S. foreign policy
towards illegal drugs, a perspective that Paul Gootenberg described in Andean Cocaine (2008) as
the “new drug history” that explores the various ways illicit drugs and trafficking have
intersected with societies, governments, and individuals.18 This integrated methodology brings a
multifaceted approach to historical inquiry by drawing from diverse fields including political
science, sociology, medicine, and economics that add new depth to the policy discussions.
Historians have also sought to penetrate the vexing inconsistencies embedded within U.S.
foreign drug policy and the federal bureaucracy that sustains it. This work has uncovered
important, if disparate, answers.
Others have dug into the questions. William McAllister’s comprehensive work, Drug
Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century (2000), describes how competing interests informed by
flawed assumptions about addiction and the superiority of western medicine undermined the
international drug control regime from the start. McAllister argues this flawed policy approach

17

“Richard Nixon's Top Domestic and Foreign Policy Achievements.” Richard Nixon's Top Domestic and Foreign
Policy Achievements, The Nixon Library, 19 Dec. 2019, https://www.nixonfoundation.org/2016/01/nixons-topdomestic-foreign-policy-achievements/.
18
Paul Gootenberg, Andean Cocaine: The Making of a Global Drug, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina
Press, 2008), 3.
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can be traced from a 1931 League of Nations Conference through to the drug war of the twentyfirst century.19
Building on McAllister’s review, Kathlyn Frydl’s examination of postwar drug policy,
The Drug Wars in America (2012), contends that the drug war served to augment state power
while the U.S. “transitioned from a regulatory illicit drug regime to a prohibitive and punitive
one” in the postwar era. Frydl highlights the consequential shift of federal drug control from
trade regulation under the Department of the Treasury to law enforcement under the Department
of Justice during the Cold War, occurring most notably under Nixon.20
Others have added to the narrative. Mathew Pembleton’s Containing Addiction (2017)
tells a similar story in recounting the history of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, the predecessor
to the Drug Enforcement Agency, arguing that America’s drug wars date back to the prohibition
era, and they always served larger American security interests, or domestic aims, beyond merely
drug interdiction.
Critiquing the viewpoint that the growth of state power alone drove U.S. foreign policy
towards drugs, some scholars find non-state actors similarly influential. Contending that
corporate power underwrites many foreign policy decisions, political economist Horace Bartilow
argues in Drug War Pathologies (2019) that the military-industrial complex undergirds drug war
policy via U.S. military aid deals and the protection of corporate assets in developing countries.21
Many have developed other viewpoints. In Seeing Drugs (2011), Daniel Weimer reviews
the formative years of U.S. modern drug policy in the early Cold War and contests the view of
supply control as cover for other state aims. Rather, Weimer argues that Cold War ideologies

19

William B. McAllister, Drug Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century, (London: Routledge, 2000), 3.
Kathleen J Frydl, The Drug Wars in America, 1940-1973, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 1.
21
Horace A. Bartilow, Drug War Pathologies: Embedded Corporatism and U.S. Drug Enforcement in the Americas,
(Chapel Hill: UNC Press Books, 2019).
20
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interpreted illegal drugs into a national antidrug American identity, one that viewed drugs as a
foreign invasion to be resolved through the same means as those used to fight communism.22
While Weimer draws a line connecting anticommunism and drug supply control, Cold
War scholarship often ignores this critical juncture. Seminal works of scholars like John Lewis
Gaddis in The Cold War: A New History (2005) address the Cold War’s larger themes of a
conflict dominated by two great powers and their respective political systems without a mention
of drug policy.23 Critiquing Gaddis’ bipolar view, Odd Arne Westad defines the Cold War as a
geopolitical and ideological struggle between “competing visions of modernity” fought largely in
the Third World.24 Yet even Westad’s paradigm-shifting work The Global Cold War (2005) that
reoriented the bipolar historical narrative towards a variegated view to include the developing
world – notably where much of the drug war has also been waged – does not directly interpret
drug policy within the overall Cold War analysis.
Weimer, however, argues that the ideological conflict of the Cold War transformed U.S.
foreign drug policy during 1960s and 70s. After WWII, the U.S. government sought to contain
international communism in developing countries while avoiding direct military engagements
with a nuclear-armed Soviet Union. During the early Cold War years, U.S. government agencies
– most notably the Department of State and the Central Intelligence Agency – developed two
theories that influenced national security strategy towards non-aligned countries:
counterinsurgency (COIN) and modernization theory.25 Rooted in social science, modernization

22

Daniel Weimer, Seeing Drugs: Modernization, Counterinsurgency, and U.S. Narcotics Control in the Third
World, 1969-1976, (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 2011), 6-15.
23
John Lewis Gaddis, The Cold War: A New History, (New York: Penguin Press, 2005).
24
Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times. (Cambridge
University Press, 2005), 17.
25
Weimar, Seeing Drugs, 6-15.
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theory envisaged a transition period for “traditional” societies to “progress” towards liberal
westernized democracy as inherently destabilizing and prone to upheaval and rebellion.26
While COIN provided financial and logistical support to foreign governments to promote
the security and prosperity that would allow western-aligned regimes to subdue leftist
insurgencies that would inevitably emerge during the messy process of modernizing. In tandem,
these two complimentary theories, Weimer argues, informed the U.S. government’s
anticommunist Cold War foreign policy strategy in developing countries, including nations that
produced and trafficked illegal drugs into the United States. Moreover, the drug-security
connection viewed through the lens of COIN focused attention on the so-called “narco-rebels” of
the Third World. Source control, under this view, would also undermine insurgent groups that
profited off drug trafficking operations especially in countries that grew poppies and marijuana
such as Burma, Thailand, and Mexico. These rebel groups used drug money to fund military
campaigns for hegemony or political independence. Assigning blame for the drug problem to
left-wing foreign insurgencies allowed the Nixon, Ford, and successive administrations to
continue linking anticommunism and foreign insurgencies with drug source control policy.27
Furthermore, pointing to foreign actors, as Pembleton argues — specifically insurgents,
rebels, or criminals — as the main culprits for America’s drug problem reframed the debate
away from public health and treatment measures towards militarized source control strategy.
Perhaps surprisingly, the 1970 Controlled Substances Act that Nixon signed included equal
amounts of funding for law enforcement and treatment for drug addiction. Nixon officials cited
successful advances in methadone treatment programs for heroin addicts. “We must rehabilitate

26

Michael E. Latham, “Ideology, Social Science, and Destiny: Modernization and the Kennedy-Era Alliance for
Progress,” Diplomatic History, Spring 1998, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Spring 1998), pp. 199-229.
27
Weimar, Seeing Drugs, 1-6. See also, Jonathan Marshall, Drug Wars: Corruption, Counterinsurgency and Covert
Operations in the Third World, (Forestville, CA: Cohan & Cohen, 1991).
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the drug user if we are to eliminate drug abuse,” Nixon said to Congress when asking for more
funding for drug treatment, particularly for soldiers returning from Vietnam, in 1971.28
Yet despite the Act’s balanced approach, demand reduction efforts initiated under Nixon
slowly lost funding in later administrations as interest from Congress waned and treatment plans
faded from public view.29 Source control supplanted demand reduction in favor of a drug war
whose envisioned enemies lived in distant jungles plotting to subvert the West by poisoning the
American people with dangerous drugs. Ronald Reagan inherited and supercharged this
worldview with both rhetoric and executive action that took the drug war on foreign soil to
unprecedented heights.30
Domestic economic policy also influenced the evolution of supply control drug policy
during the Cold War. U.S. pharmaceutical firms allied themselves with an anticommunist
foreign policy based on COIN and modernization theory that would open the door for
multinationals like Merck to reach developing world markets. The pharmaceutical industry
argued that the benefits of manufactured drugs (those psychoactive substances deemed medically
useful and regulated) could allow U.S. firms to serve as ambassadors of capitalism and
democracy to the Third World. As Dominique Tobbell explains in his book, Pills, Powder, and
Policy (2012), the U.S. government recruited pharmaceutical companies to provide vaccines,
medications, clinics, and training for developing counties to showcase the American model of
free enterprise through medicine. In one telling exchange, the chairman of the Pharmaceutical
Manufacturers Association glowingly testified to Congress in 1960 that “probably through no
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other industry can the superiority of our American competitive system be demonstrated so
impressively.”31
Meanwhile, during the 1950s and 1960s, as William McAllister notes, pharmaceutical
companies lobbied against western governments’ increasing restrictions on licit narcotics
distribution domestically, while aggressively marketing manufactured psychotropic drugs in
poorly regulated countries throughout Latin America, Africa, and Asia to make up the market
loss.32
In one example, Congress passed a bill in 1960 proposed by President Eisenhower called
“Health for Peace” to create a government agency to collaborate with the Soviet Union on
medical technology and training. Intended to calm fears of the USSR winning the medical
technology race, the bill placed medical and pharmaceutical businesses into the Cold War
battlefield.33 As Kathlyn Frydl explains, transitioning farmers in developing countries away
from cultivating poppies, despite that the plant’s derivatives had been used for licit medicinal
purposes for centuries, suited the bottom line of U.S. pharmaceutical companies.
These companies later helped influence regulatory policy under the Controlled
Substances Act that put “imported” drugs like heroin and marijuana on a more punitive schedule
than manufactured, though arguably just as addictive and dangerous, drugs like amphetamines
and barbiturates.34 Thus, with one hand the U.S. government appropriated American
pharmaceutical firms to promote a capitalist vision of modernity during the Cold War; while the
other hand — beginning most forcefully with the Nixon administration — insisted developing
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nations take action to reduce illicit drug supply within their borders to receive the benefits that
U.S.-aligned modernity would bring.

From Trade to Enforcement: Drug Control in The United States
The U.S.’s drug policy story also exposes the intrinsic assumptions that informed ideas of
American national identity during the Cold War consensus era. As David Musto describes in
The American Disease (1999), since the early days of the FBN under the leadership of longserving director and drug policy hawk Harry Anslinger, “drugs-as-disease” dominated the
mindset of policymakers, administrators, and the medical community.35 The metaphor allowed
drugs to be viewed as a foreign contagion that once introduced spread endemically through
society. Source control, therefore, represented the best public health solution under the drugs-asdisease theory dominant within drug enforcement thinking during the decades before and during
the Cold War.
Despite Anslinger’s worldview, for most of the twentieth century, drugs had been
regulated as a traded commodity rather than wholly criminalized. This began to change in the
postwar years as drug laws and enforcement in the United States at the federal and state level
transitioned from a regulatory to a punitive regime. In 1968, the FBN moved out of Department
of the Treasury to the Department of Justice, reorienting the agency towards drug crime in lieu of
drug trade regulation. After Nixon’s election on an antidrug platform and the passing Controlled
Substances Act of 1970, the carceral state ballooned, disproportionately impacting minority
communities throughout the country.
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Many scholars have examined this shift under Nixon that fundamentally altered the
government’s approach towards drug control. Frydl argues that since drug control policy could
never “punish a market out of existence,” the drug war came to serve state power in other
arenas.36 While other scholars such as Michelle Alexander in her work The New Jim Crow
(2012) view this transition through the lens of race and class, recasting the punitive drug war
measures as responses to the advances of the civil rights movement during the 1960s and a
retrenchment of institutional racism.37 Pembleton notes how the large personalities of Anslinger
and his successor, Henry Giordano, combined with the agency’s sluggish reaction to changing
public norms towards recreational drug use all played a part in influencing how the federal
bureaucracy rationalized this shift.38
The bureaucratic transition, however, resulted in a splintered and legally confused drug
enforcement infrastructure just as the cultural sands shifted in the United States towards drug
use. For the Nixon administration, the muddled nature of the federal drug control response
presented an opportunity for the president to reshape the future of drug control in important
ways. Despite his administration’s emphasis on treatment, Nixon, like Anslinger, fully embraced
the drugs-as-disease metaphor, noting that drugs were “a problem which afflicts both the body
and the soul of America.”39
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Drug Policy and 1960s America
As a question of national character, the Cold War consensus that portrayed Americanism
as a global force for good could not easily synthesize drug addiction within its purview. Westad
argues that American national identity is uniquely “teleological,” and the certainty of human
progress moving into the future defines both America and the world perception. In other words,
Americans and their governments operated with the assurance that “what is America today will
be the world tomorrow,” Westad writes.
Yet, drug use in the United States increased dramatically in the years leading up to the
1968 election, with some studies showing a five-fold increase in heroin use between 1960-70,
and other drugs showing similar increases in users. Violent crime also spiked during these years,
coinciding with increased civil unrest in many major cities.40 Built upon value systems of selfreliance, progress, and rule of law, postwar American modernity strained to reconcile this
increase in illegal drug use and addiction within its purview. The drugs-as-disease metaphor, by
contrast, rationalized this contradiction by painting illegal drugs as hostile foreign interference
that challenged American core values.41 Nixon’s law-and-order campaign purposefully seized
upon drugs to crystalize the fears of those who still clung to Cold War consensus identity amidst
the backdrop of increasing crime and a perceived waning of American hegemony abroad
resulting from the Vietnam war.
Scholars have also shown how Nixon and the Republican party intentionally created a
platform centered around drug policy as practical politics. Political scientists documented the
40
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backlash of white voters after the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Voting Rights Act
of 1965 that led to Nixon’s “Southern strategy,” a campaign that focused attention on coded
racial language to attract disaffected white Southern Democrats to the Republican party.
Changes in immigration law also played to this stratagem as the 1965 Immigration and
Nationality Act abolished a restrictive and racialized quota system in favor of a familyreunification policy that ultimately allowed more immigrants from developing countries into the
United States. The law-and-order campaign pledge contrasted a caricature of a collapsing
“traditional” moral society fleeing to suburbia with lawless inner cities inhabited by minorities,
immigrants, drugs, and crime. The rise in illicit drug use across the societal spectrum during the
mid-1960s provided a ready moral high ground for white social conservatives to contrast an
American antidrug identity against the backdrop of a changing nation.42
At the close of the decade, news of American soldiers addicted to heroin fomented an
acute moral panic that brought drugs and national identity to the forefront of public opinion.
Scholar Jeremy Kuzmarov describes in The Myth of the Addicted Army (2009) how drug abuse
became a persistent issue among soldiers in Vietnam, yet the media portrayal and subsequent
public outcry over returning GIs addicted to heroin overstated the breadth and scope of problem
significantly. Even though the numbers of addicted soldiers were much less alarming than their
portrayals in government and media, Nixon seized upon the issue to further the administration’s
drug policy aims.43 In June 1971, Nixon delivered his historic speech that declared illegal drugs
a “national emergency” and “public enemy number one,” citing returning soldiers as victims of a
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pernicious enemy. President Reagan would later distill U.S. antidrug identity into its purest form
when he said, “Drug abuse is a repudiation of everything America is.”44
If Nixon effectively reoriented the moral compass of drug control within America,
considering the man himself also merits scrutiny. That Nixon himself struggled with substance
abuse in the form of alcoholism has not eluded his biographers. Evan Thomas describes in Being
Nixon: A Man Divided (2015), how Nixon’s inner circle often policed his drinking habits in the
interest of keeping the President sober and lucid in case of a national security crisis. As the
Watergate investigation intensified in 1973, Nixon started drinking heavily and taking sleeping
pills. While the president sought to mobilize the federal government to elevate the fight against
drugs to a national emergency, Nixon’s own tortured relationship with his drugs of choice, and
inability to fully control his abuse, presents a certain tragic irony in this drug policy story.45
~~~
When the former senator and vice president assumed the Oval Office in 1968, President
Richard Nixon inherited a nation in crisis with drugs playing a central role. As the Cold War
consensus buckled under the weight of Vietnam and questioned a national identity, drug use and
violent crime surged in many cities across the country that a disjointed federal drug bureaucracy
found itself unable to counter. Framing America’s problems, as Nixon did in his Anaheim
speech, as a direct result of nefarious foreign actors – dangerous drugs – fit within Nixon’s
worldview and coalesced with the federal government’s Cold War policy aims.
Under this backdrop, Operation “Intercept” — like much of U.S. drug policy past and
present — represented a particular expression of American identity during a time of crisis.
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Viewing drugs as a foreign-born disease, “Intercept” would, under this mindset, squash the
disease at its root and bolster a national antidrug sentiment among a disaffected electorate.
Moreover, fortifying national borders would accomplish these dual aims simultaneously, as
Weimer describes, “U.S. drug control entailed exerting state power over its borders not only to
interdict illegal drugs but also to use drug policy as a tool of national identity construction—as a
vehicle for combatting ‘foreign dangers.’”46
This thesis argues that Operation “Intercept” and the Nixon administration’s tactic of
unilateral coercion—a practice in kind with the President’s law-and-order platform—formed the
proof-of-concept for a drug war ideology that reframed the U.S.’s globalized illicit narcotics
policy strategy during a critical juncture in U.S. history. Nixon’s decision to portray American
drug abuse as a mostly foreign and not domestic problem had fundamental consequences for
U.S. public health and foreign policy. Operations “Intercept” and “Cooperation” also
demonstrate how the language of warfare empowered a transactional foreign policy on narcotics,
one that later metastasized Nixon’s political prerogatives into an enduring national security ethos
that once fully embedded within the federal bureaucracy, extended well beyond its original
scope. For the U.S. southern neighbors, Nixon’s “Intercept” birthed a narco-dogma that has
overshadowed U.S-Latin American relations for more than half a century, with often fatal
consequences for many on both sides of the border.
Nixon’s pivot to Mexico and illegal drugs, therefore, arguably played a greater role in
shaping U.S. foreign policy, and national identity, than the historical record acknowledges, and
merits additional scrutiny. To reconcile Nixon’s divergent policies towards Mexico and the
region, this thesis builds upon Daniel Weimer’s compelling analysis that links U.S. drug policy
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to the Cold War-era concerns during the Nixon and Ford administrations. It also expands upon
Nixon’s attempted foreign policy pivot to Latin America in 1969 while adding further depth to
the document record on Operation “Intercept” as a launchpad for the newly militarized and
border-focused war on drugs.
Chapter 1 of this paper analyzes the frustrated rollout, and eventual diplomatic fallout, of
Operation “Intercept” through an examination of declassified U.S. government documents from
various federal agencies. Documentary evidence reveals both the motivations and foreign
relations tactics of the U.S. policymakers who devised and executed Nixon’s drug war with the
Mexican government.
Chapter 2 situates “Intercept” within the larger context of U.S.-Latin American policy
developments in 1969 when the White House sought a reset of relations within the region and a
renewed push towards multilateralism. As drug use in the United States garnered public
attention domestically early in Nixon’s first term, the administration crafted solutions to stem
drug supply by drawing from a familiar anticommunist toolkit. Cold War theories of
modernization and COIN coalesced around the supply control ideology ultimately employed on
the U.S.-Mexico border with Operation “Intercept.” In this analysis, “Intercept” formed the
basis for a new drug foreign policy with Mexico that arguably undercut Nixon’s own desire for
multilateral cooperation and respect within the hemisphere.
Chapter 3 discusses the public media reaction to “Intercept” from the U.S. and Mexico
when both drugs and Cold War concerns weighed heavily on American minds. Disparate
reactions to Nixon’s war on drugs rhetoric from various major media outlets underscores the
conflicted nature of Nixon’s drug policy approach and the fraught public debate about whether
they truly represented the “foreign dangers” that the administration railed against.
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Finally, the conclusion in Chapter 4 assesses the legacy of Operation “Intercept” and how
Nixon’s war on drugs continues to underwrite Washington’s policy solutions towards
international drug control sixty years later. With the passage of the Controlled Substances Act in
1971, the supply control ideology that Nixon empowered became firmly embedded within the
federal bureaucracy domestically, and a vital pillar of U.S. foreign policy towards drug source
nations internationally. For Mexico, the same drug supply control programs established under
Operation “Cooperation” reemerged with the signing of the Merida Accords in 2007. The
Accords drew from a familiar law-enforcement focus, supply control-driven playbook that Nixon
and the federal drug bureaucracy championed more than half a decade earlier. Despite its
notable shortcomings in preventing illegal drug use and abuse domestically, Nixon’s
international war on drugs that began with Operation “Intercept” continues to resonate in the
United States’ drug policy towards Mexico and the Latin American region well into the 21st
century.
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Chapter 1
Operation “Intercept”: An Exercise in International Extortion
“Scars will remain for some time to come” – Nixon’s Border War with Mexico
U.S. Ambassador Robert McBride expressed concern over the president’s plan. On
September 18, 1968, just days before President Nixon would effectively shut down U.S.’s
southern border, he met with the Mexican Secretary of the Interior, Luis Echeverria, to relay the
details of “Intercept”. McBride followed up with a confidential cable to Secretary of State
William Rogers in Washington suggesting that his Mexican counterpart, Foreign Secretary Luis
Echeverria, likely “did not grasp fully the inconveniences and difficulties [Operation “Intercept”]
may cause.”47 Within a week, they became unequivocally apparent when the Nixon
administration’s war on drugs brought cross-border traffic to a grinding halt and threatened U.S.Mexican relations.
Like Secretary Echeveria, Ambassador McBride had been informed only recently of
Washington’s plan. Nixon’s Special Task Force comprised twenty-two different government
agencies, including the departments of Defense, Justice, Commence, Labor, Health, and
Transportation, among others. Notably absent was a representative from the Department of State
that the report listed as only in an “advisory capacity.”48
The Task Force’s final report issued on June 6, 1969, lists no State Department staff in
attendance, belying the minimal role the U.S. Embassy in Mexico or its Washington counterparts
at State played in the Task Force’s deliberations that summer. Nixon’s letter to agency heads
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calling them to serve on the Task Force mentions that the U.S. Ambassador to Mexico would be
“kept posted” rather than participate on the committee.49
While the letter does not explain the rationale for excluding State in the Task Force,
Nixon had likely already determined that his first action on the war on drugs would upset the
Mexican government. As the report’s cover letter shows, Nixon’s White House gave the Task
Force a mandate to address the drug issue, “with specific emphasis on the Mexican border
problem.”50 Even though the Task Force eyed action towards Mexico from the outset, Nixon
chose to work around State Department officials and avoid traditional diplomatic channels to
implement “Intercept.” Instead, Nixon empowered domestic-focused federal agencies such as
the Departments of Customs and Justice, institutions that were arguably more amenable to
militarizing the border than the State Department.
While State was sidelined in Washington, “Intercept”, however, would soon become a
mission critical priority for Ambassador McBride in Mexico City. A few months before
McBride’s worried cable, Nixon’s Deputy Attorney General Richard Kleindienst, co-chairman of
the Dangerous Drugs Task Force, flew to Mexico City in June 1969 to meet with Mexican
government officials. Kleindienst understood the success of Nixon’s drug war hinged on
Mexico’s compliance, so he initiated the meeting to discuss the Task Force’s findings and push
the Mexican government to reduce the production and transport of illegal drugs within their
country. Providing few administrative details, Kleindienst reported that Washington was
preparing for “all-out war” against drugs entering the United States. Mexican officials were
noncommittal, they noted substantial eradication and marijuana seizures earlier in the year and
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suggested that American financial aid and technology could help improve crop destruction and
reduce Mexico’s domestic production. Lacking tangible results from the Mexican government,
Kleindienst and the American delegation returned to Washington ready to lay the groundwork
for Operation “Intercept”.51
Although the Task Force report elevated the war on drugs to “the highest rank of those
matters affecting the vital interests of the nation,” the U.S. Embassy Mexico City knew little of
Nixon’s drug war before it came to fruition.52 Washington sent the first official cable to the
Embassy with details on the border closure plan on August 20, 1969, less than a month before its
implementation. Washington’s cable questioned if “Intercept” could possibly upset the
upcoming meeting between President Nixon and Mexican President Diaz Ordáz as they jointly
inaugurated the Amistad Dam on September 8.53 Built by the binational government agency the
International Boundary and Water Commission, the dam sat upon the Rio Grande River between
Texas and Coahuila, Mexico, and would provide needed water reservoirs for both countries.
Amistad, the Spanish word for friendship, symbolized the interdependence and solidarity of the
U.S.-Mexican border community that the two leaders would celebrate at their inaugural
meeting.54
Despite Washington’s concerns, the two presidents enjoyed a fruitful discussion with
Nixon proclaiming the Amistad Dam testified “to the spirit of understanding and cooperation
which binds our two countries.”55 Ambassador McBride wrote lavishly in a cable the following
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day about the Mexican president’s response to the summit. McBride wrote, “Diaz Ordáz was
pleased by references in President’s speech to special relationship existing with Mexico,” noting
the Mexican president was “extremely gratified . . . and in excellent form.” Further, Diaz Ordáz
expressed to the Ambassador his “real desire to assist in controlling drug traffic,” acknowledging
the issue’s personal importance to the American president’s agenda.56
The next day, the New York Times reported leaked plans of Operation “Intercept”
prompting Kleindienst to hold a press conference. Confirming the reports of the planned border
inspections, he hoped that “one of the by-products of Operation “Intercept” will be that the price
of marijuana will become prohibitive” and beyond the reach of American youth.57
On the heels of the press leaks, Washington sent a cable to McBride in Mexico City to
request a meeting with the foreign minister to brief him on “Intercept” and reaffirm the
president’s appreciation for the “valuable cooperation we have had from the Mexican authorities
in the past and our confidence that this cooperation will continue to be forthcoming.”58
While awaiting a meeting, McBride replied to Washington confessing doubts about the
viability of the operation in light of the press leaks, noting: “While I am aware of enormity of
problem, I wonder if Operation “Intercept” in its present marred condition is really worth risking
serious difficulties with the Mexicans.”59
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After dutifully performing damage control with Mexican officials, Ambassador
McBride’s report back to Washington expressed deep concerns that the incident would
negatively impact U.S.-Mexico relations. He recommended no further briefings citing a few
“unfavorable developments” in Mexico City that “somewhat chilled the atmosphere” the two
presidents created since the Amistad Dam meeting. McBride further feared the fallout from
“Intercept” “may become an issue in our bilateral relations, and that the Mexican Government
may accuse us of bad faith in announcing the commencement of ‘Operation Intercept’ without
the consultation which we had promised.”60
McBride’s pleas failed to delay “Intercept’s” launch. After a few trial runs, on
September 21, at 2:30 p.m., a force of 2,000 U.S. Customs personnel launched coordinated total
inspections at all ports of entry along the 2,500-mile border. Increased sea patrols and radar
stations monitoring air traffic complimented the vehicle inspections.61 American and Mexican
press reported enormous traffic jams in multiple ports of entry, vehicle breakdowns, intrusive
body searches, and angry travelers. At the San Ysidro border in San Diego, lines of cars
stretched at one point six miles into Tijuana with long wait times. U.S. Customs officials
inspected over 400,000 people crossing into the U.S. from Mexico during the first day alone,
with only four arrests made for drug possession. They also reported below average drug
seizures, a point Kleindienst and other officials claimed as evidence of the program’s efficacy.
The Associated Press reported a Customs official in San Diego said of the low tallies, “a
smuggler would have to be pretty stupid not to take a vacation.”62
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Blowback from “Intercept” came from all sides. News media in Mexico and the United
States reported on border business communities furious at heavy sales losses, in some estimates
dropping between fifty and ninety percent. Mexicans who worked across the border in the
United States arrived late to work. Unions and trade organizations in Mexico began boycotting
U.S. businesses in retaliation.63
Just over a week after “Intercept’s” launch, on September 29, the Bureau of Budget sent
to the White House a report criticizing the Special Task Force’s findings, calling them “grossly
inadequate” and “likely to result in embarrassment to the President in an area of extreme
importance to him.”64 The Budget Bureau highlighted the low cost-benefit ratio for the U.S.
taxpayer of reduced marijuana production compared to other “hard drugs” like heroin or LSD.
The report also underscored potential risks to U.S.-Mexican relations noting the high export
value of marijuana for Mexican farmers, the entwined business interests of border communities,
and the ability of organized crime to easily switch products to maintain their market. A thorough
study to “address the issue of allocation of federal resources against marijuana vs. hard drugs”
should be initiated to compliment the Task Force’s findings, the report recommended.65
Criticism of “Intercept” continued. President Diaz Ordáz heightened tensions when he
met with three lunar landing NASA astronauts including Buzz Aldrin in Mexico City on
September 29. During a televised toast, he remarked on the “somber curtain” that “raised a wall
of suspicion” between the two countries in recent weeks. That same day, a National Security
Staff aide wrote a memo to National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger summarizing the
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negative reactions in both the Mexican press and government and recommended bilateral talks
recommence.66 The Department of State’s Country Director for Mexico sent a memo to
Kleindienst urging caution, noting that “Mexico’s reaction to “Intercept” has been more hostile
than anticipated and, if it continues, may well affect U.S.-Mexican relations in areas unrelated to
narcotics control.”67
In late September, Ambassador McBride met with exasperated Mexican officials angry
over the increased border inspections. President Diaz Ordáz told McBride that “relations
between the two countries were being poisoned,” and suggested sending a delegation to
Washington because he feared the press hounding U.S. government visitors to Mexico City. In
an October 2 cable, McBride recommended that any solution to the drug issue must involve a
compromise that avoids “further humiliating Mexico.”68
Others intervened. Kissinger sent a memo to Nixon on October 7th after receiving a note
from Secretary Echeverria imploring the President to call off “Intercept” for the sake of Mexican
business owners and national pride. Kissinger suggested Nixon sign a response note of support,
explaining his view that, “a great deal of the intensity of the feeling is due, I believe, to the belief
that that the U.S. is cooling off towards Mexico . . . it does appear, in short, that the operation is
becoming a serious problem for our relations with Mexico.”69
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Despite the clamor against “Intercept” from within and outside the government, Nixon
refused to waver. The New York Times reported on October 4th that law enforcement officials in
the United States planned to further pressure and embarrass the Mexican government into action
by publishing a list of twenty U.S.-indicted drug felons at large in Mexico. Though news of the
Mexican delegation’s arrival in Washington delayed the list’s release, administration officials
kept “Intercept” in place in the meantime until Mexico “demonstrates . . . a willingness and
ability to put marijuana suppliers and producers out of business,” according to the Times.70
Other reports noted that “Intercept’s” vehicle inspections simply moved drug trafficking
skyward. Yet with only one airplane in the Customs fleet and poor radar equipment, U.S. law
enforcement were admittedly no match for the smugglers. The New York Times quoted customs
officials who acknowledged the scheme’s shortcomings while touting its true purpose. “Total
inspections of northbound vehicles amounted to nothing less than limited economic sanctions
against Mexico,” the report noted.71
During a press conference that same week, California Governor Ronald Reagan
foreshadowed his future role in the drug war when he publicly supported the president’s policies,
adopting the drugs-as-disease rhetoric by comparing illegal drugs to infectious viruses. “There is
only one way to stop an epidemic, and that is to isolate the causes of the virus and destroy it.
And Operation “Intercept” is trying to do just that,” Reagan said.72
A breakthrough came during the third day of talks when both the U.S. and Mexico
delegations agreed to “adjust” the total inspection protocols and participate in further joint talks
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in Mexico City later that month. The delegations announced on October 10 that Operation
“Intercept” would become Operation “Cooperation”, ending total border inspections.73 Echoing
the proclamations of solidarity made just a month earlier at Amistad Dam, the joint communique
agreed that Operation “Intercept” had created “irritations and frictions which, if not eliminated,
could seriously affect the friendly atmosphere and mutual understanding that fortunately have
prevailed in relations between the U.S. and Mexico.”74
Further talks that month resulted in promises from Mexico to destroy hashish and heroin
labs and prosecute members of organized crime residing in Mexico. The accord respected
Mexican sovereignty by noting that any antinarcotics operations within Mexican borders would
be conducted solely by Mexican law enforcement. It also pledged more investment from the
United States and ensured further commitments from Mexico to enforce its drug laws
domestically.75
Yet, this limited success came at a high price fiscally and diplomatically for the United
States. The surge force of Customs officers conducting close to three million total inspections
over twenty days cost approximately $30 million, or over $9,000 per pound of marijuana seized,
one study showed. Law enforcement officials admitted the cost would be unsustainable as a
permanent interdiction measure.76
As part of a drug policy intended to reduce drug use in the U.S., results remain mixed. A
thorough study conducted in the program’s wake found that though the price of marijuana
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increased as availability decreased, and “Intercept” did not reduce drug usage as the illicit market
provided ready substitutes like hashish for buyers during the marijuana shortage.77
In mid-November as talks with Mexico were ongoing, Nixon felt compelled to send a
note to President Diaz Ordáz expressing his “personal regret of the friction which Operation
“Intercept” has caused.”78 Signing off the year after a trying first six months as ambassador,
McBride wrote one final cable to the Secretary of State William Rogers on New Year’s Eve,
1969. McBride expressed cautious optimism for the new decade, though predicted the “scars of
“Intercept” will remain for some time to come.”79

“We have proved our point effectively” – “Intercept” Inaugurates a New Drug War
Operation “Intercept” had immediate consequences for the drug war on both domestic
and foreign policy issues. Despite “Intercept’s” unsustainable cost and questionable successes,
Nixon’s heavy-handed approach in facing down Mexico uplifted his bona fides as the law-andorder candidate playing to his political base. While the Nixon administration spent millions in
federal dollars on a border seizure plan and caved to Mexican demands for very little in return,
“Intercept” laid the foundations for Operation Condor, Mexico’s large scale crop eradication
program that came into force in 1975.80
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“Intercept’s” immediate economic impact hit border communities hardest. Yet the
exercise exposed to the broader public the weaknesses of the border control apparatus that would
help U.S. Customs officials improve future border security.81 These impacts of Operation
“Intercept” remained, however, mostly collateral damage. As Gordon Liddy clarified years later,
Nixon’s main goal had been coercion all along, and despite acquiescing to Mexico’s demands,
the president used the economic brinksmanship of “Intercept” to bring Mexico more fully on
board with the U.S. government’s vision of the new drug war. As President Nixon wrote in a
note top White House Counsel John Ehrlichman on October 7, the day the delegations began
their talks in Washington: “It would appear that this is the time to negotiate since we have
proved our point pretty effectively.”82
Nixon’s coercive foreign policy approach to address illegal drug trafficking and drug
addiction, therefore, constituted one possible response among many at a critical juncture in the
history of the drug control regime. The varied effects of modernity—globalization, technology,
improved living standards, and U.S. soldiers fighting in foreign wars, among other factors—
elevated the illegal use of narcotics into an issue of grave national concern for many developed
nations during the mid-20th century.83 The increase in narcotics use, drug-related deaths, and
drug-related crime had reached new highs in 1960s America. Meanwhile current government
regulation, law enforcement, and public health measures were insufficient to address them.84
Nixon’s fateful decision to militarize the southern border with “Intercept” employed the
national security apparatus to address a public health issue, as subsequent chapters of this thesis
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with address in greater detail. And despite not meeting the administration’s stated goals to
reduce drug use in America, the Nixon administration hailed “Intercept” as a success (if mainly
in the political sense). Though the situation called for a domestic public policy response,
Nixon’s worldview refocused domestic drug abuse as a foreign problem. As Pembleton
described, Nixon’s war on drugs, “punished its own drug users and sought to ‘Americanize’ the
rest of the world.”85
Nixon’s singular focus on Mexico as a staging ground for his drug war also merits
examination. In 1969, the Task Force estimated that nearly eighty percent of illegal marijuana
arrived through Mexico, a number that appeared to justify Nixon’s policy approach.86 However,
as the Bureau of Budget pointed out during “Intercept”, a focus on “hard” drugs that arrived
through other ports of entry like Miami could have resulted in a greater reduction in drug
availability in the U.S. had the president chose that path.
Nixon’s personal views and political instincts may have influenced his choice to look
southward to solve the drug problem. As a native Southern Californian and the first U.S.
president from the west coast, Nixon grew up exposed to Mexican Americans like no other
president. He also made notable strides to support the Mexican American community as
president when he ordered the first census to include Spanish-speaking Americans and appointed
over one hundred Latinos to executive-level positions during his administration.87 Despite this
inclusivity, White House tapes captured a different version of Nixon’s personal views on
Mexicans and race in a private Oval Office meeting with two close aides in May of 1971:
Now Mexicans are a different cup of tea…They’ve got a heritage, but at the
present time they steal, they’re dishonest, they do have some concept of family life
at least. They don’t live like a bunch of dogs, like the Negroes do. The Mexican
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American is different from the Mexican…there’s a certain morality in Mexico.
And, frankly, you’ll find a hell of a lot less marijuana use in Mexico than in the
United States.88
Nixon’s view of Mexicans as inherently dishonest—yet paradoxically moral—may have
motivated “Intercept’s” bullying tactics toward Mexico. As a white man from Southern
California, Nixon may have perceived that attacking Mexico made for an effective political
strategy by galvanizing his core constituency, the so-called “silent majority,” against a familiar
antagonist. The vocal support for Nixon and “Intercept” by then Governor Ronald Reagan,
another successful politician who launched his political career in Orange County, California,
lends credence to this political argument.
Operation “Intercept” heralded a new phase in the drug war that exemplified how U.S.
antinarcotics policy unfolded in the coming decades. “Intercept’s” supply-reduction approach
employed significant funding resources and personnel, the results of which at best produced an
insignificant and temporary reduction in the street price of illicit drugs in the United States at
exorbitant costs. Focusing on the southern border deflected attention away from drugs as a
domestic policy issue and dredged white racial resentment by portraying a foreign nation,
Mexico, as a malignant influence on the American public.
Nixon’s deliberate coercion and public humiliation of the Mexican government in
“Intercept” established the war on drugs as a dualist ideological battle that required foreign
governments to align with the United States’ supply-side law enforcement tactics or face
unilateral intervention. For Latin America, where much of the drug war unfolded, “Intercept”
also exemplifies a self-defeating domestic policy with international consequences; perspectives
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from border communities and diplomats in the State Department would largely be ignored,
causing as much harm on U.S. border communities as those in Mexico.
This documentary analysis of the development and execution of Operation “Intercept” by
U.S. government policymakers offers insights into Nixon’s decision to mobilize and focus state
power beyond U.S. borders to address a growing domestic drug abuse problem. The United
States’ war on drugs overseas started years before the Nixon administration and stretches well
past his presidency. Nonetheless, “Intercept” entrenched a drug doctrine at a pivotal moment in
the nation’s history and helped define a presidential legacy.
As Chapter 2 explores, fully connecting these themes requires further historical analysis
of Operation “Intercept” within the context of U.S. foreign policy towards Latin America in
general, and Mexico specifically, during Nixon’s first term. As scholar Kathleen Frydl, aptly put
it, “the drug war . . . with striking regularity” often serves as a “frame to view the world and the
U.S. role within it.”89 And the enduring nature of the U.S. drug war justifies further exploration
of its origin story.

89

Frydl, The Drug Wars in America, 423.

36

Chapter 2
Nixon’s “Special Relationship”: Drugs, Modernization, and U.S. Policy Towards Latin
America in 1969
“One of the more conspicuous hypocrisies of the American way in foreign policy is our
combination of vocal solicitude about the inter-American system with visceral indifference to the
Latin American ordeal. On ceremonial occasions, our leaders talk lavishly and righteously about
hemisphere solidarity...But one cannot resist the impression—certainly Latin Americans don’t—
that deep down most North Americans do not give a damn about Latin America.”
—Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., “The Lowering Hemisphere”, The Atlantic, January, 197090
At a private meeting at Camp David on the morning of September 27, 1969, President
Nixon met with top White House aides and officials from the State Department to finalize a
month’s long reorganization project of U.S. foreign policy towards Latin America. Nixon set the
tone of the meeting by employing the language of love to articulate his singular focus to recast
Latin America as a centerpiece of U.S. foreign policy in the ensuing decade. “It means more to
make love to the Latin Americans than it does to any other area,” Nixon opined. “They feel they
have a special relationship [with the United States], and this is important. We should treat [Latin
America] with this special concern.” Nixon eagerly sought to counter the perception he believed
Latin Americans held that the U.S. had them “on the back burner.” Rather, Nixon insisted the
relationship must be based on mutual respect insisting Latin America be on “front burner No.
1.”91
Yet six days earlier, Nixon launched Operation “Intercept”, a drug enforcement scheme
that sent a surge force of two thousand U.S. Customs agents to execute a zero-tolerance
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inspection policy at the U.S.-Mexico border. “Intercept” intended to halt the trafficking of
illegal drugs into the United States while also coerce Mexico to prioritize antinarcotics on their
domestic agenda. For more than three weeks in September-October 1969, “Intercept” caused
massive lines at the land ports of entry, sparked trade disruptions on both sides of the border, and
fomented resentment that sent U.S-Mexico relations to new lows.92 While Nixon lunched at
Camp David and spoke ardently of a new era of regional partnership, an embittered Mexican
President Diaz Ordáz hosted the recently returned to earth Apollo 11 astronauts in Mexico City
where during a state dinner he broke diplomatic decorum to admonish the Nixon
administration’s drug policy towards Mexico on live television.93
If Nixon earnestly intended to reorient U.S. foreign policy in Latin America towards
collaboration and mutual respect, as the document record suggests, why did the president take
unilateral action to coerce Mexico on drug policy so early in his administration? In other words,
how did Nixon’s “war on drugs” antinarcotics policy, in particular Operation “Intercept”,
reconcile with Nixon’s desire for a “special relationship” with Latin America in general? And
lastly, how did Mexico, a neighbor and ally, fit within Cold War concerns and worldviews that
dominated other U.S. foreign policy decisions towards Latin America during Nixon’s first year
in office?
At first glance, Nixon’s well-documented “war on drugs” that kicked off internationally
in 1969 with Mexico and Operation “Intercept”, and domestically in 1970 with the Controlled
Substances Act, appear incompatible with Washington’s Cold War aims, or Nixon’s strategy of
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rapprochement towards Latin America. Historical literature offers insights into these policy
questions through narrative frameworks of drug policy, Cold War history, or U.S.-Latin
American relations. Yet the literature does not directly address these concerns. Drug histories
often tell the story of the U.S. war on drugs through the valence of a particular narcotic like
heroin or cocaine, cultural studies of drug use, or via the U.S. federal government’s drug control
apparatus. These histories often consider “Intercept” as a steppingstone in a larger story of the
emergence of the modern drug control regime.94
The dominant narratives of Cold War literature, moreover, do not speak directly to U.S.
drug policy as a substantive factor in the nature or outcome of the conflict, particularly as related
to the developing world.95 While the historical record details how Nixon transformed
antinarcotics into a policy pillar for U.S. relations with many developing nations, reconciling
Nixon’s pivot to Latin America with the coercive tactics of “Intercept” in 1969 merits further
investigation. Understanding the nexus between drug policy and the Cold War, therefore,
requires research from both fields of scholarship.
To answer these questions this chapter presents a document-based analysis of the Nixon
administration’s policy towards Latin America during the first year of his presidency while
focusing on Operation “Intercept” and U.S. drug policy towards Mexico. A review of archival
government documents including White House records, State Department cables, National
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Security Council and other government agency records from the Departments of Justice and
Treasury, uncovers how key policymakers adjudicated these critical shifts in U.S. policy towards
Latin America and Mexico in 1969. Informed by scholarship on both drug history and the Cold
War, the analysis examines “Intercept” within Nixon’s policy framework towards Latin America
during the pivotal genesis period of America’s “war on drugs.”
This chapter contends that by refocusing the drug problem on foreign actors like Mexico,
the Nixon administration connected the supply control ideology of drug control with Cold War
concepts of containment, international development, and national identity that hewed more
closely to Cold War policy aims than previously understood. Specifically, “Third World”
development concepts of modernization and COIN dating to the Eisenhower administration
found common cause with Nixon’s support of supply control ideology already endemic within
the federal drug bureaucracy by 1969, cementing the link between illicit drug control and
anticommunism during the Cold War.96
Moreover, the shared border between U.S. and Mexico influenced the evolution of the
U.S. approach to the drug problem by conceptualizing a hybridized domestic-foreign policy
where concerns of border security and national identity clashed with diplomacy and
multilateralism. “Intercept” therefore formed the basis for a new drug foreign policy with
Mexico that arguably undercut Nixon’s own desire for multilateral regional cooperation and
respect within the hemisphere.
To examine these assertions this chapter will first review the Nixon administration’s
reevaluation of U.S.-Latin America policy in 1969 and how the anticommunist underpinnings of
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modernization and COIN theories influenced policymakers thinking on Latin American issues
during the Cold War détente.
The chapter will then discuss the ideological origins of Nixon’s drug foreign policy with
Mexico via Operation “Intercept” in the context of the regional policy shift in Nixon’s first term.
Nixon branded dangerous drugs in the mold of international communism as a “foreign danger”
that warranted a militarized federal response at the level of international intervention, if required.
For Nixon’s White House, the outcome of “Intercept”, Operation “Cooperation”, validated this
policy stance by establishing a successful template for a coercive drug diplomacy devised from a
similar Cold War anticommunist toolkit.
Lastly, by placing U.S.-Mexico policy in the global context of the U.S.’s supply control
drug regime with developing countries offers insights into how “Intercept” contrasted with the
U.S. government’s supply control solutions employed with developed countries. Modernization
theory and COIN explain both the Nixon administration’s militarized interventionist tactics used
toward Mexico and the soft power diplomacy used with France during an international drug
control conference a few months later. In 1969, the Nixon administration prioritized the
perceived “foreign danger” of drugs internationally in favor of a domestic public health strategy,
a decision that helped redefine the U.S. government’s response to drug policy in the region for
decades to come.

“Our Deepest National Interest” – Modernization and Nixon’s Latin America Policy
A few days before the January 1969 presidential inauguration, Nixon’s National Security
Advisor, Henry Kissinger, exchanged cordial notes with Lincoln Gordon, the then president of
Johns Hopkins University and former U.S. Ambassador to Brazil. In one letter, Gordon included
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a copy of a recent speech he wrote entitled “Latin America – The Struggle for Modernization.”
Gordon, a former director for the Marshall Plan under President Kennedy, argued in his speech
that further U.S. involvement in Latin America is in the nation’s interest, in line with the former
president’s approach. “There seems to be an almost instinctive recognition in our public opinion
that a successful Latin America could be a pillar of strength for freedom in the world and
therefore for in our deepest national interest,” Gordon concluded.97 Kissinger thanked him
kindly for the text and promised to meet with the ambassador the next time he was in
Washington.
The correspondence with Gordon speaks to Kissinger’s and the NSC’s ideological
framework ahead of Nixon’s push to reshuffle U.S. policy towards Latin America. Together
with Walt Rostow, former National Security Advisor during the Kennedy and Johnson
administrations, Gordon helped design President Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress in 1961. This
decade-spanning Latin American economic aid program—that expressly excluded Cuba—upheld
America’s Cold War priorities of the early 1960s. The Alliance argued that if living standards
could be improved, free market economics would take hold in developing countries and reduce
the likelihood of socialist revolutions. Science and technology, provided by wealthier nations to
developing ones, would drive this virtuous cycle as developed countries served as agents of
change to spur fledgling countries’ transition from “tradition” towards “modernity.”
Scholars have examined the Alliance in detail. Michael Latham describes in his
influential work, “Modernization and the Kennedy-era Alliance for Progress,” the idea of
Rostow as the intellectual founder of “modernization theory.” Within the federal government,
this theory underpinned the ideological worldview that U.S. aid and intervention “could push
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“stagnant” societies toward the universal, evolutionary endpoint represented by an America that
had already arrived there.” In Washington, modernization became a persistent mindset among
policymakers and think tanks during the late 1950s and 60s that, according to Latham, “reflected
a broader worldview, a constellation of mutually reinforcing ideas that often framed policy goals
through a definition of America's values, character, and mission.”98
In early February, a few weeks after Gordon’s letter, Kissinger sent a memo at the
president’s request to the National Security Council to conduct a broad study on U.S. policy
towards Latin America. The study looked specifically at political developments – “especially
coups” the memo noted – development policy, and regional multilateral institutions like the
Organization for American States.99 In the final report produced a few months later, in just eight
pages the words “modern,” “modernize,” or “modernization” appear thirteen times in the NSC’s
study. Like Gordon’s speech, the report describes a consensus view among the interagency that
Latin American countries found themselves at the critical juncture on the path from “tradition” to
“modernity” in 1969. “Latin America is completely caught up in its drive to modernize,” the
report noted. “Modern industrial culture has had a disruptive impact on traditional forms of
social and political organization throughout the region.” This presented both risk and
opportunity for the United States, concluding that further American involvement in the region
was needed not only to counter socialism and the Soviet influence, but as a moral imperative:
And perhaps as important, failure to assist Latin America in its struggle toward
full-fledged modernity would tax our consciences. That such a drift could open
the hemisphere to hostile foreign powers is true; but more fundamentally, it
would be incompatible with our own history and principles.100
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While the NSC report focused primarily on issues of development, Cold War
anticommunist priorities remain prominent. Notably, the only head of state named in the report
was Fidel Castro: “The threat that Castro can successfully export his revolution is ebbing, while
Soviet influence is expanding through traditional diplomatic and economic channels.” The
document, however, also concedes that rising anti-American nationalism could impede U.S.
collaborative efforts in the region. Latin American modernization, according to the NSC report,
presented no easy choices for U.S. policymakers within a Cold War framework:
It is probable that Latin America’s modernization cannot occur except at the
expense of U.S. influence, at least in terms of the paternalism with which we have
expressed it in the past. Anti-U.S. coloration of nationalism is not itself new or
unexpected. What is disturbing is the threat that this nationalism may present
when taken in conjunction with a Soviet presence and a Soviet willingness to
offer itself -- partially or hypothetically -- as an alternative to Latin dependence
on the U.S.101
In meeting minutes after reviewing the NSC’s report, Nixon agreed with the agency’s
view that a “paternalistic” U.S. would prove ineffective in influencing the region. Stressing his
view that the United States should highlight its “special relationship” with Latin America, Nixon
remarked that “the U.S. government should avoid doing too much in Latin America, and must
recognize it could not control the region, but could influence it.”102
Undoubtedly, Nixon’s mindset towards Latin America was influenced by the hostility he
encountered on a 1958 trip to several South American countries. Making a goodwill tour to
ostensibly support democracy with the region, protestors in Peru and Venezuela attacked the then
vice president’s motorcade, throwing trash, brandishing clubs, and nearly overturning Nixon’s
vehicle at the airport in Caracas. Barely escaping the angry mob, the vice president and his wife
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retreated to the U.S. embassy. President Eisenhower deployed U.S. troops to Venezuela
following the incident, an embarrassment for the Venezuelan government, Nixon then lamented.
Nixon partially blamed the unruly protestors on communist agitators, yet also perceived the
limits of the United States’ ability to influence Latin America without major policy changes.103
Yet remarkably, as president in 1969, Nixon also voiced his support for covert
interventions to counter the communist threat when he “pointed to Indonesia as a possible
cautionary historical precedent -- the military prevented the country from falling to the
communists.”104 As Vincent Bevins detailed in The Jakarta Method (2020), in 1965, CIA covert
operatives supported an Indonesian military coup to depose Indonesian President Sukarno, whom
U.S. officials believed too far left in a region too vital for U.S. national interests. The Indonesian
military’s purge that followed killed, jailed, or “disappeared” hundreds of thousands of
Indonesians suspected of being communists.105
Presaging the administration’s approach to Mexico with Operation “Intercept”, Nixon’s
worldview, therefore, could conspicuously hold two seemingly contradictory ideas in the same
orbit: that the U.S. should avoid trying to control Latin America while still reserve the right to
intervene – clandestinely if necessary – in another country’s affairs against the threat of
international communism.
Had they listened in to Nixon’s July 1969 NSC policy meeting, Latin American officials
would likely have agreed with Nixon’s first premise, but certainly not the second. Just a few
months before the NSC meeting, Latin American heads of state publicly pushed towards
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improved U.S. relations via more regional autonomy. In April 1969, twenty-two Latin American
countries – including delegates from Mexico – met in Chile to discuss regional issues, purposely
without a U.S. delegation present. Their accord, the “Viña Del Mar Consensus,” outlined several
mutually agreed upon policy stances vis a vis the United States including a desire for equitable
treatment of trade, improved debt relief programs, and respect for national sovereignty, all under
an overarching goal for each nation to “reach solutions fashioned according to their own criteria,
reflecting their national identity.”
Although the report does not mention Cuba specifically, the language on the topic of
sovereignty and trade barriers implicitly critiques the U.S. trade embargo, and U.S. interventions
like the failed Bay of Pigs invasion. The Consensus underscored the “juridical equality of states”
that requires respect for the principles of “nonintervention in the internal or external affairs of
other states, that is, no kind of action that interferes with the personality of the state and the
political, economic, and cultural elements that constitute it.”106
Encased in an elaborately formal notebook, the twenty-two-nation delegation sent a copy
of the Consensus Report to Nixon in June of that year. White House aide Viron Vaky reviewed
the report and noted in a memo that the “remarkably frank document . . . lists all [of Latin
America’s] gripes,” specifically that “US assistance has become distorted and now serves US
self-interest more than development needs.”107
Nixon took the document into consideration before his Latin America speech in October
1969. After the July NSC meeting, Secretary of State William Rogers suggested a big policy
speech as a way for Nixon to make his policy plans towards Latin America public. Nixon agreed
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and planned to use the Security Council report, the Consensus document, and a report that the
president had commissioned from then Governor of New York, Nelson Rockefeller, due to arrive
later that summer to formulate his speech outline.
The idea for Governor Rockefeller to submit a report on Latin America grew out of
Nixon’s first interaction with a foreign dignitary as president. On January 21, 1969, the day after
his inauguration, Nixon met with the OAS Secretary General Galo Plaza. He and Plaza spoke at
the White House for forty-five minutes in which Nixon expressed his “deep interest in the
problems confronting Latin America.” Notably, during the meeting Plaza suggested sending
New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller on a fact-finding tour of the region, citing his strong
support among Latin American nations.108 Nixon called Rockefeller that day who agreed.
Originally considering a short trip, Rockefeller delayed a few months to expand his listening tour
to twenty countries, eventually departing in May 1969. Nixon maintained regular
correspondence with Rockefeller until he returned in July and handed in a 135-page report to the
White House.
With the input of social scientists, economists, and other advisors from civil society and
government, Rockefeller’s Latin America report was replete with charts, graphs, and extensive
general and country-specific analyses. It commented on wide range of subjects, while focusing
most intently on issues of internal security, economic growth, and social cohesion as critical
factors in the coming decade. Notably, Rockefeller’s findings frequently echoed the Cold Warinflected language of modernization theory and COIN. In a section entitled “Communist
Subversion,” Rockefeller warned of increased “political and social instability” leading to a
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nationalist “tendency to turn to authoritarian or radical solutions” in the form of military coups
that “will find expression in terms of independence from U.S. domination and influence.”
Ironically, Mexico is markedly absent from the report’s recommendations apart from
President Diaz’s recommendation to establish a civilian-led Inter-American Security Council
located outside of Washington. It would coordinate security operations across regional
governments combat the “subversive” (i.e. communist or merely left-leaning) elements
throughout the region. Like Nixon, Rockefeller expressed an ardent desire for U.S. policy to
reflect a “special relationship” based on multilateral engagement between the United States and
Latin America. Anticommunism during the Cold War and the ideology of modernization theory,
however, inherently constrained the policy thinking for both men.109
Although Nixon took Rockefeller’s recommendations under consideration, he intended to
stamp his own vision onto U.S.-Latin American relations. Once the NY governor returned with
his report, Nixon met Rockefeller, Kissinger, and Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs
Charles Meyer, at Camp David that September to finalize a reorientation of U.S. regional policy.
Meeting minutes portray not only Nixon’s insistence on moving Latin America to “front burner
No 1,” but his intent to find ways to express the “special relationship.” He levelled sharp
criticism at the State Department:
The State bureaucracy was very intelligent, loyal and able, the best in
Washington. But in the 23 years he had known it, it had not had one imaginative,
bold new idea . . . Forget that, forget the bureaucracy, [the President] was going to
get a new Latin American policy or else. If it did not come from the State
Department, it would come from the White House.
Among other proposed changes, the group agreed the State Department would rename its
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regional bureau to the Western Hemisphere – instead of Latin America – to include Canada and
create a new Under Secretary for Western Hemisphere Affairs to give it a higher profile within
the department.110
In another exchange at the Camp David meeting, Nixon supported Rockefeller’s internal
security recommendations and disagreed with critics in Congress who argued that the U.S.
government should shun military dictators in the region. True to his law-and-order rhetoric and
the tenets of modernization theory, for Nixon, internal stability was paramount. “Are they friends
or enemies, will they be stable, will they accept private investment” – these were the tests of
friendship, in the president’s view, that would determine how the United States would ration its
aid to the region. Nixon ended the meeting with a final word that he “wanted to follow a very
tough line on Cuba” with no speculation in the press that the administration “was considering a
new policy.”111
While Nixon met Rockefeller and State Department officials in Camp David that
September, Operation “Intercept” had already strangled border traffic and soured U.S.-Mexico
relations for nearly a week. Conversation memos do not mention talk of Mexico, yet the
president’s support of coercive diplomacy with “Intercept” fits noticeably within Nixon’s “friend
or foe” worldview. After U.S. delegates left Mexico City with empty promises from the
Mexican government earlier that July, “Intercept” demonstrated to Mexico how the new
administration in Washington would respond to Latin American nations out of step with Nixon’s
worldview. Moreover, a conciliatory approach on drug diplomacy, especially towards Mexico,
would run afoul of the newly elected law-and-order president who had made drugs a central part
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of his political strategy. In July 1969, the White House’s draft bill on drug control sought a
tougher line on drug policy domestically by expanding the BNDD’s wiretapping and warrant
authorities, among other proposals.112 Internationally, Mexico became an “enemy” state, in
Nixon’s view, for flouting the White House’s demands on curbing illicit drugs. “Intercept”,
therefore, became both a politically expedient solution for a White House keen not to appear soft
on drugs, and a diplomatic solution that fit within Nixon’s dualist worldview.
Despite the unilateralism of “Intercept”, Nixon forged ahead in the fall of 1969 with his
attempt to refashion a U.S.-Latin America policy based on mutual respect and partnership. A
month after the Camp David meeting, and shortly after the Customs shut down “Intercept”,
Nixon prepared his signature speech on U.S. policy towards Latin America. In an internal
memo, the president chided Kissinger that the speech needed to be “more blunt and direct.” “For
twenty years there has been discussion [of Latin American issues]” the president insisted,
“instead of talk and promise, we are now acting.”113 Kissinger and White House aide Bob
Haldeman rewrote the speech adding stronger language that highlighted the United States’
commitment to building a more robust regional partnership in the hemisphere. When Nixon
delivered his final version to the Inter-American Press Association in Washington on October 31,
1969, he stated unequivocally his intent to put Latin American interests on equal footing with
U.S. goals. “What I hope we can achieve, therefore, is a more mature partnership in which all
voices are heard and none is predominant—a partnership guided by a healthy awareness that
give-and-take is better than take-it-or-leave-it,” he emphasized.114
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In the first year of his presidency, Richard Nixon devoted considerable attention and
resources towards a remaking of U.S. policy towards Latin America. Taken together, the NSC
report, Rockefeller’s findings, the Vina Del Mar Consensus, along with reorganizations at the
State Department reflect a White House intent on prioritizing Latin American issues in
Washington. The October 31st speech culminated nearly a year’s worth of work and stands as a
remarkable attempt by the President to tilt Washington’s foreign policy axis network southwards.
“Our partnership should be one in which the United States lectures less and listens more,” Nixon
stated humbly in his speech. “It should be one in which clear, consistent procedures are
established to insure [sic] that the shaping of the future of the nations in the Americas reflects the
will of those nations.”115
The document record shows, however, that Nixon’s high aspirations towards Latin
America often collided with the Cold War realities of anticommunism and the ideological
constraints of modernization theory and COIN during the first year of his presidency. While
Nixon publicly professed support for multilateral solutions to regional problems and a desire for
greater autonomy among Latin American nations, he reaffirmed in private a hegemonic “sphere
of influence” worldview where the U.S. can, and should, intervene to thwart communism
uprisings. Moreover, he frustrated regional allies by retaining a recalcitrant U.S. policy toward
communist Cuba and accepted U.S.-friendly military dictatorships despite rhetoric supporting
democracy and human rights.
Furthermore, between April and October 1969, while Nixon tried to reset relations with
Latin America, his administration took a parallel and dissonant policy track towards illegal drugs
that would undercut its own lofty goals towards regional cooperation. When Nixon trained the
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U.S. government’s eye towards Mexico, domestic concerns of border security and drug control
slammed headlong against the realities of a shared national border.

“Move Against the Source” – “Intercept” and Nixon’s Drug Policy Towards Mexico
Early in his administration, Nixon laid clear his intent to make good on his Anaheim
campaign promise and prioritize drug enforcement using source control methodology. In April
1969, just a month before Governor Rockefeller departed on his Latin American tour, White
House advisor John Ehrlichman wrote a memo to Secretary of State William Rogers citing drug
abuse as the “root cause” of the nation’s rising crime problem and noting its foreign origins.116
That same month, the president made an unprecedented move by commissioning an interagency
“Task Force on Marihuana [sic] and Dangerous Drugs.” He appointed the hardline Deputy
Attorney General Richard Kleindienst as committee chair with instructions to “move against the
source of drugs.”117
Nixon, of course, did not invent source control strategy himself. Scholarship on the
federal drug bureaucracy shows that dating back to the prohibition era of the 1920s, source
control ideology existed in some form within U.S. foreign policy. Isaac Campos argues that the
story of marijuana in Mexico, the so-called “gateway” drug, precipitated much of the modern
international narcotics policy. “The origins of the War on Drugs lie in the legal and ideological
roots of prohibition,” he explains.118 Beginning in the 1930s, the Federal Bureau of Narcotics
(FBN) under the formidable and long-tenured leadership of FBN director Henry Anslinger had
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for many years advocated attacking drug producers in source countries. Employing a “drugs as
disease” worldview, for much of the twentieth century U.S. federal agents pushed for more
substantial foreign interventions to contain the spread of the contagion at the source.119
Yet a disjointed federal drug bureaucracy where drug control remained under the
Department of Treasury and domestic enforcement spread over multiple agencies including the
FBI persisted through the Johnson administration and limited the reach and scope of U.S. drug
enforcement actions overseas.120 To the delight of federal drug agents, Nixon’s first year as
president refocused federal narcotics policy on source control, empowered federal drug
enforcement agencies, and ultimately unleashed a whole-of-government approach to
antinarcotics interdiction abroad that often sidelined traditional diplomacy. And it began with
Mexico.
After eight weeks of subcommittees and report gathering, Kleindienst presented the
finding of the drug Task Force to the White House in June 1969. Source control figured
prominently from the first page of the report as the Task Force named foreign criminals as the
major cause of America’s drug issues: “As the primary sources of supply, free-land smugglers
and organized traffickers are largely responsible for the marijuana and drug abuse problem.”
The final recommendations narrow further towards addressing criminal activity in one country,
Mexico: “The objective of the Task Force has been to formulate a plan for positive and effective
action to control the illicit trafficking of drugs across the Mexican border.”
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The report’s sweeping recommendations sought a massive overhaul of border security
unprecedented in the nation’s history. The Task Force recommended additional funding and
personnel for customs inspections and enforcement. To attack drug production sources of poppy
and marijuana farms in Mexico, the report relied on technological solutions including aerial crop
monitoring and eradication using chemical defoliants. Expanding Custom’s footprint, the report
called for enhanced border infrastructure such as extending the border wall and building
additional parking. Importantly, the report called for greater collaboration between Mexican and
U.S. law enforcement via training and intelligence sharing, and a more streamlined extradition
process for narcotics offenders apprehended in Mexico.121
The report’s focus solely on Mexico contrasts markedly with the international nature of
drug production by the late 1960s. In addition, the Task Force’s makeup included agency
representatives from across the U.S. government, including Departments of Justice, Treasury,
Customs, Defense, Labor, Commerce, Agriculture, Health and Human Services, and
Transportation. While the wide range of committee membership reflected Nixon leveraging the
whole-of-government approach against illegal drugs, the one agency mainly responsible for
dealing with foreign governments, the Department of State, had only an “advisory capacity,” and
it is unclear if State Department representatives attended any committee meetings. Nonetheless,
the report recommended diplomatic action towards Mexico throughout, noting in one section
titled, “Role and Responsibility of the State Department in Securing Mexican Cooperation,” that,
“The State Department must devote its efforts to persuading Mexico to place a program for
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eradication and control of marijuana and dangerous drugs among the highest of its national
priorities” (emphasis added).122
White House records do not directly explain why the Nixon administration excluded the
State Department—and the recently appointed ambassador —from the Task Force’s
deliberations. However, the document record leading up to “Intercept” shows an administration
intent on concealing its drug interdiction plans from the Mexican government. State Department
officials would likely have sought closer collaboration and greater transparency with the
Mexican government, as cables from Ambassador McBride pleading for the White House call of
“Intercept” demonstrate. In the eyes of Nixon’s aides, involving State could have undermined
the administration’s new drug strategy before it started.
Moreover, from his earliest days in office Nixon sought to make good on his campaign
promise to attack the drug problem. Influenced by a troubled visit to Latin America as vice
president ten years earlier, Nixon doubted State’s ability to devise “bold new ideas” especially
on issues like drug supply control that could easily ruffle diplomatic feathers with Latin
American governments.123 The traditional diplomacy of the U.S. State Department, therefore,
took a back seat to Nixon’s own bold agenda to remake both U.S.-Latin American foreign and
drug control according to his own worldview.
In addition to excluding the diplomatic corps, the Task Force had no representative from
the Mexican government despite its heavy focus on a shared border and enforcement action
within Mexico. After the Nixon White House took the recommendations and devised Operation
“Intercept”, the Mexican government first learned of the border interdiction plan just ten days
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before its planned launch. The New York Times leak of the plans before its officials could be
properly consulted further frustrated the Mexican Foreign Ministry.124 The U.S. Ambassador
McBride wrote about the “unfavorable developments” that had chilled bilateral relations and
recommended confidentially that the operation be suspended to ease diplomatic tensions between
the U.S. and Mexico.125
Over the Ambassador’s objections, the White House forged ahead with “Intercept” as
planned to considerable consternation from Mexican officials, the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City,
and residents on both sides of the border. Customs agents and the various federal agencies
supporting the effort did not, however, share these negative views. The document record shows
that while the press leak tipped off smugglers and undermined the ability of border agents to
claim increased drug seizures, multiple agency reports touted “Intercept’s” success. In addition
to Custom’s (disputed) claims of increased seizures, agencies as far afield as the Federal
Avionics Administration, General Services Administration, the Air Force, and the Coast Guard
all submitted reports to show their contributions to “Intercept’s” joint effort. While it never
materialized, even the Justice Department prepared additional judges and court staffing for an
influx in drug detainees at various district courts across the U.S.-Mexico border.126
After three weeks of full inspections, Customs Commissioner Myles Ambrose sent a
lengthy report to the White House on October 6 replete with seizure stats and descriptions of
historically high agency morale: “I can report that morale is at the highest peak in the history of
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the Customs Service. Despite the long hours of extra duty and the arduous workloads, the
average customs employee is strongly in favor of this effort and the administration’s needs to
mount such a project,” he reported.127
With evident support from the White House, Ambrose even printed explanatory
pamphlets to hand out to frustrated travelers at the border entitled “A Major Effort to Guard the
Nation’s Borders and Ports Against the Growing Volume of Narcotics from Abroad.” Quoting
President Nixon’s July speech to Congress on drugs, citing that the drug problem has become “a
national problem of serious magnitude,” the pamphlet doubled down on the drugs as “foreign
dangers” worldview by noting for its readers that “virtually all of the narcotics . . . is produced
abroad and smuggled into the United States.” Customs sought only to “punish the wrongdoer,
but the innocent traveler may be delayed or inconvenienced,” the pamphlet explained.
Ambrose’s zealous public support of Nixon’s drug plan best demonstrated how concepts of
supply control and drugs as a foreign-born disease were endemic within customs officials and
much of the federal law enforcement bureaucracy in 1969.128
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After twenty-one days of border gridlock, U.S. delegates led by Kleindienst met with
Mexican officials in Washington. In exchange for the halt of total inspections on October 10,
Mexico agreed to negotiate a bilateral antinarcotics agreement in the coming months, rebranding
Operation “Intercept” as Operation “Cooperation.” On December 12, 1969, the Joint Working
Group of U.S. and Mexican delegations signed an accord that foundationally shifted both the
level of collaboration between the two countries on narcotics, and the Mexican government’s
stance towards more active interdiction efforts on its own soil.
With the notable exception of U.S. efforts to reduce arms trafficking into Mexico, when
compared side by side, the final measures of the Joint Working Group’s agreement, or Operation
“Cooperation”, closely resemble many of the recommendations of the Task Force report of June
that year, also led by Deputy Attorney General Kleindienst. Mexico agreed to aerial detection
and crop eradication programs with the assistance of U.S.-provided planes and helicopters.
Mexican and U.S. law enforcement would begin trading intelligence to investigate narcotics
rings and cooperate on extradition in exchange for U.S. surveillance technology and police
training. Mexico increased efforts to increase drug interdiction and reduce production within its
borders in exchange for increased U.S. economic aid to develop its enforcement and judicial
institutions.129 “Intercept”, therefore, despite its notable failure to reduce drug availability in the
U.S. and the reticence of Mexican government officials, met the Task Force’s central goal of
coercing the Mexican government into making drugs one of its “highest national priorities.”
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“Agent of Change” – Nixon’s Drug War in the Global Context
While the White House negotiated with Mexico, a day before the signing of Operation
“Cooperation”, John Ingersoll, the Director for the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs
(BNDD), met with officials in France on December 11 on a mission to attack another source of
illicit drugs coming into the United States. In 1969, most of the illegal heroin sold on U.S.
streets came from Turkey via Marseille and then was smuggled into New York harbor, the route
known as the “French Connection” (immortalized by an eponymous feature film in 1971).
In Paris, U.S. delegates led by Ingersoll began a series of multilateral conferences under
the Franco-American Inter-governmental Commission on Drug Control that focused on
coordinating with the French police to bring down organized crime related to the heroin trade.
Representatives from Italy, Belgium, Spain, and Turkey also attended. The collaborative tone of
the meeting minutes portrays a Nixon administration committed to multilateral diplomacy on
foreign drug policy in Europe.130
Cooperation between the BNDD and its European counterparts eventually helped take
down the French Connection drug ring in 1972. In an ironic twist, however, the clandestine drug
market resulted in more heroin being produced in Mexico and smuggled north through the
southern border.131
The contemporaneous juxtaposition of the Franco-American Conference and Operation
“Cooperation” provides an instructive interpretive lens to understand how Nixon reframed the
contradictions of U.S. drug policy, both in theory and in practice during his first term. The lack
of coordination with the Mexican government on drug control issues – through only one
uneventful meeting in Mexico City in July 1969 – ahead of “Intercept” compares starkly with the

130
131

Ibid.
Weimer, Seeing Drugs, 63.

61

multilateral and consultative efforts across the Atlantic. The disparity of treatment towards
developing countries demonstrates how modernization theory and COIN’s worldview inflected
on U.S.-Mexico relations. Similarly, the Task Force’s report portrayed Mexico as a nation still
in a transitional stage of modernity where internal security must first be imposed before society
could fully thrive. The report euphemistically singled out “convincing” Mexican officials to take
a tougher line on drugs as the key step to reduce drug use and drug-related crimes in the United
States.
Showing the very paternalism that Nixon railed against in his Latin America speech, he
used the shared border as a bludgeon to forcefully impose his administration’s version of lawand-order upon Mexico, with drug supply control as the justification. Along with the technology
sharing of airpower and intelligence gathering, the United States became what Rostow would
have called the “agent of change” Mexico required to realize its lurch towards modernity.
Imagine for a moment in Paris, by contrast, if the United States suggested that French
citizens and merchant vessels be subjected to total inspections in New York harbor or the Miami
airport until the French police doubled down on its organized crime syndicates what the response
would have been. European delegates surely would have laughed the idea off as preposterous,
but such was not the case with Mexico in 1969.
Imposing supply control policy on the southern border also fit within the ideological
framework of containment during the Cold War. For policymakers, illicit drugs represented
“foreign dangers” not only because poppies and marijuana plants grown mostly outside the U.S.
supported the “drugs as disease” metaphor, but for the drug trade’s potential to undermine U.S.
Cold War priorities. The NSC studies and Rockefeller report frequently pointed to the threat of
“communist subversion” in Latin America by the Soviet Union and Cuba, highlighting the need
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to contain the spread of international communism in the region. As later policies in Colombia
would make explicit, U.S.-funded supply control methods like crop eradication begun after
“Intercept” would be exported to developing countries to prevent leftist “narco-rebels” from
using the drug trade to finance their insurgencies – policies that continued even after the end of
Cold War.132
In 1971, the Nixon administration helped craft the Controlled Substances Act and the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1971 that granted the executive power over U.S. foreign aid which it
used as both carrot and stick to compel developing countries like Turkey, Burma, and Thailand
to bend to U.S. foreign drug policy priorities in successive administrations.133 Nonetheless, the
bully tactics of “Intercept” still stand out as a foreign policy exception. While Nixon revamped
U.S. drug policy towards developing countries in Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America, no
other nation would experience a public display of discord the likes of “Intercept.”
As the only developing country to share a border with the United States, it is perhaps
understandable that Mexico would play a fundamentally different role under Nixon’s drug policy
shift than other drug supply countries as “Intercept” and “Cooperation” demonstrate. Ironically,
in this way Mexico perhaps merits Nixon’s designation of maintaining “special relationship”
with the United States more than any of its regional peers.
By 1971, Nixon’s foreign policy pivot towards multilateralism in Latin America had
faded to the background behind the pressing issues of Vietnam and China. Nixon’s rhetoric
around multilateral cooperation in Latin America would soon be overshadowed by U.S.
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interventions in domestic elections and support of military dictatorships in Chile and Panama.
Towards the end of Nixon’s first term, Latin America once again fell to the back burner of U.S.
foreign policy. By contrast, Nixon’s policies propelled the drug control bureaucracy and its
source control ideology to “front burner no 1.”134

Conclusion: “Our Most Natural, and Desirable Loyal Friends and Neighbors”
In July 1969, before “Intercept” and Nixon’s speech on U.S.-Latin American policy,
Arizona Senator Barry Goldwater wrote the president asking him to attend a meeting of U.S. and
Mexican business leaders on the southern border as a show of regional solidarity. The 1964
Republican presidential nominee credited with birthing the conservative movement that led to
the Reagan Revolution in 1980 had himself crafted a special relationship with his state’s
southern neighbor. Goldwater referenced the Rockefeller report when he beseeched Nixon to
consider developing deeper partnerships with Mexico and the rest of Latin America. He worried
that “unless something is done, and done quickly, in those countries we are going to lose the
most natural, desirable and loyal friends and neighbors we will ever have.”135
The President responded warmly to Goldwater’s message but did not attend the meeting
at the border. While Nixon waxed lyrically about “making love” to Latin America, his
administration’s actions in 1969 beginning with Operation “Intercept” show that the president
ultimately chose his war on drugs for domestic reasons over his “special concern” for the region,
a decision that would have lasting consequences for Mexico and the future of drug control.
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Relatively unprecedented in the modern presidency, the Nixon White House had no
qualms about using the nation’s southern border as a diplomatic bargaining tool to bring the
Mexican government in line with the administration’s priorities. A more militarized and
controlled border fit the profile of a national antidrug identity that prioritized domestic security
over multilateralism. Nixon openly appealed to this antidrug identity in his campaign speech in
Anaheim in 1968 and sought to honor his commitment to a law-and-order policy platform, both
at home and abroad, once in office.
During his first year or so in office, agency documents showed how Nixon empowered
domestic enforcement agencies including the Customs Bureau and the BNDD to set the
administration’s agenda for prosecuting the drug war overseas, starting with Mexico, while often
ignoring State Department recommendations and conventional diplomacy, especially while
engaging with developing countries. Yet, despite its tactical failures and multiple issues with
“Intercept’s” rollout, heads of U.S. customs, narcotics, and defense agencies all supported a more
militarized border not merely as a one-off negotiation tactic, but as a potential template for a
sustained border security strategy well into future.
The document record of Nixon’s first year in office demonstrates that in the early days of
the administration, U.S. policymakers intentionally redefined drug policy strategy under the
guise of combatting “foreign dangers.” Like the fight against international communism, this
realignment allowed the White House to take the drug fight overseas with greater firepower and
political flexibility. Moreover, the tactics of “Intercept” – the primacy of law-and-order policy,
unilateral intervention towards a developing country, and the sidelining of diplomacy – argue
that the U.S. drug control policy towards Mexico begun under “Intercept” aligned more closely
with the conceptual frameworks of anticommunism and modernization theory that the historical
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record acknowledges. In the case of “Intercept”, and arguably U.S. drug foreign policy writ
large, domestic political considerations and Cold War priorities that favored a non-porous border
and interventionist antinarcotics policies overseas triumphed over Nixon’s drive towards
multilateralism in Latin America.
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Chapter 3
Press Coverage of Operation “Intercept”: Nixon, Drugs, and National Identity in 1969
Historians have analyzed Nixon’s revamp of the federal bureaucracy to wage a domestic
drug war particularly with the passage of Controlled Substances Act in 1970 that dramatically
changed the face of drug enforcement in the United States.136 Less addressed in the historical
literature is Nixon’s explicit reorientation of the drug narrative towards foreign actors as the
culprits in a fight against illegal drugs and how the American public perceived that rhetorical
shift.
How did the U.S. news media report on Operation “Intercept”, a brazen act of coercion
towards a friendly nation and ally, Mexico? How did border communities, those most affected
by the inspections, react to the administration’s drug interdiction policy? Lastly, how did a
nation divided over drugs in the late 1960s interpret Nixon’s primacy of the drug war in U.S.
foreign policy?
This chapter addresses these questions by examining of print news media from U.S.
regional and national news outlets between September and November of 1969. Patterns emerge
through these mediums that offer insight into how Nixon turned illegal drug use from a public
health issue into a “foreign danger.” U.S. journalism from this period underscores how Nixon’s
use of the language of war reframed the public debate about drugs towards foreign enemies and
militaristic responses, often with the help of journalists that reinforced this linguistic shift.
While many news articles criticized the tactics of “Intercept”, print media also shows
how local and national news often interpreted the coercion of the Mexican government in
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domestic terms, with some even using Mexico to satirize drug users in the U.S. The disparate
reactions of border city papers compared to those further inland also point to the unique nature of
borderlands socio-politics on issues of national identity. Finally, print media in Mexico during
this period offers a transnational perspective of how Mexican media understood “Intercept”, drug
production and trafficking in Mexico, and its relationship with the United States.

Operation “Intercept” in Print Media: September 14, 1969, to November 8, 1969
On September 9, 1969, a few days before Operation “Intercept” was scheduled to launch,
Felix Belair Jr. of the New York Times published an exclusive report that detailed leaked plans
including details about the boats and aircraft the administration would use to ensnare would-be
drug smugglers. The leak’s timing could not have been worse for the White House since only
the day before, Nixon and Mexican President Gustavo Ordáz Diaz concluded their first congenial
meeting as heads of state by inaugurating the Amistad Dam, or Friendship Dam, on the Rio
Grande.137 A photo of the two presidents awkwardly embracing under the word “Amistad” ran
next to Belair’s column about “Intercept”, a plan that up to that point, U.S. officials had not fully
disclosed to Mexican authorities.138 Not only did the leaked report undermine “Intercept’s”
chance to surprise smugglers, it shocked and frustrated Mexican government officials who, after
a fruitful bilateral meeting, saw Nixon’s about-face as a gratuitous insult to their country on the
world stage.139
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While the U.S. Ambassador to Mexico absorbed pressure from the Mexican Foreign
Ministry to call off “Intercept”, an Associated Press (AP) news report entitled “U.S. Mounting
Blitz at Border to Cut Flow of Mexican Pot” on September 14, a few days before the planned
launch. Repeating official lines about “cut off the flow at the source” and how the “Mexican
government is being urged to increase its inspections” to reduce drug trafficking into the United
States. The article discussed “Intercept’s” goals of reducing drugs through interdiction at the
border, but also quoted the administration official in charge, Deputy Attorney General Richard
Kleindienst, who belied “Intercept’s” true aim: “the ultimate objective,” Kleindienst said, is
“meaningful cooperation with the Mexican government to have a significant control drive in that
country.” While the report ignored Mexico’s blindsiding and vociferous objections to
“Intercept”, the article notably stated without qualifier how the U.S. government planned to use
the southern border as a bargaining tool to “urge” Mexico into action.140
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Other reports from the AP and local press during the first few weeks of “Intercept’s”
inspections focus on operational issues, long lines, and frustrated travelers and businesses. On
September 22, Newsday reported through Combined News Services from Tijuana how the
operation had “apparently trapped more innocent motorists than anything” as “motorists were
backed up in a monumental traffic jam that extended six miles into the Tijuana border.” The
article quoted a Mexican tourism official from Tijuana who quipped that trying to stop drugs
through border checks “is like trying to cure cancer with aspirin,” adding that, “Drugs are a
worldwide problem and just stopping up a few borders is not going to stop it.” 141
Others echoed the problems. An AP report on September 23 entitled, “Tempers Flare
Along Border,” published in the San Bernardino County Sun interviewed frustrated travelers and
business owners who bemoaned “Intercept’s” lengthy delays and the indignities during the
inspections, while noting that the seemingly impressive inspection numbers had in fact few drug
seizures to show for it.142 The New York Times quoted customs officials who acknowledged the
scheme’s shortcomings while touting its true purpose. “Total inspections of northbound vehicles
amounted to nothing less than limited economic sanctions against Mexico,” the report noted.143
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As “Intercept” dragged on into its second week, press coverage across many major U.S.
news outlets criticized the negative impact on border communities, questioned its success at
reducing drug smuggling, and the sensibility of using coercive tactics against a neighboring
country. The San Francisco Examiner highlighted the struggles of Mexican businesses on the
border that planned a forthcoming protest with a report titled, “Mexico ‘Ghost Towns’ Plan U.S.
Dope Drive Protests.” Critiquing “Intercept’s” tactics, the piece quoted a physician from a U.S.
Senate subcommittee on drugs who warned that any reduction in the availability of Mexican
marijuana would quickly be replaced by hashish from North Africa.144
144
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There were other critiques. United Press International (UPI) reported through Newsday
that “Pot War May Not Be Panning Out” citing sources who claimed that smugglers still found
ways to get marijuana into U.S. markets despite the total inspections at the border.145 Another
UPI report from Mexico City described the sour turn of U.S.-Mexico relations thanks to
“Intercept.” The article quoted Mexican officials pointing to the U.S. demand as the primary
driver of drug production and trafficking in Mexico. It proclaimed the real reason for “Intercept”
was blatant coercion of the Mexican government deriding it as “Operation Bad Neighbor.”146
Those reporting on the border noted the challenges. An AP article from Nogales
published in the Sacramento Bee cited Mexican businessman assembling a boycott of U.S.
businesses on the border in a forceful response to “Intercept” dubbed “Operation Dignity.”147
On October 1, after two weeks of inspections and border gridlock, the Los Angeles Times
reported on a speech delivered by President Diaz when he hosted the Apollo 11 astronauts in
Mexico City on their world tour after the moon landing. At a celebratory dinner with Buzz
Aldrin, Diaz interjected during his congratulatory speech that “Intercept” was a grave “error”
that heedlessly divided the two countries.148
Not all press coverage highlighted “Intercept’s” flaws, however. UPI reported on
October 1, 1969, ten days into the border blitz then California Governor Ronald Reagan’s
unwavering support for Nixon’s drug plan. Reagan cited numerous stats and figures of increased
drug seizures in addition to well-worn—though contested—tropes of the time that marijuana was
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an addictive gateway drug and that a rise in crime in California correlated directly to a rise in
drug addiction. Reagan doubled down on the drugs-as-disease metaphor already endemic in
federal government law enforcement thinking when he said the only way to cure this “epidemic
of narcotics addiction . . . is to isolate the virus, and “Intercept” is doing just that.”149 Later
reports and studies of “Intercept” showed that customs seizures dropped precipitously despite
increased border checks. While the price of marijuana did rise somewhat in locations closer to
the southern border, users substituted other drugs like hashish during the temporary shortage.150
Some editorials found reason to support “Intercept” like Governor Reagan, employing a
drugs-as-disease worldview and supply control ideology that depicted the underlying causes of
America’s drug use problem as inherently foreign. A Tucson Daily Citizen editorial on
September 29 castigated Mexico for failing to eradicate the “roots of the drug problem” within
its country and lauded the seizure program as “essential…until Mexico cracks down harder on
drug producers and distributors south of the border.”151
A day later, the Los Angeles Times published an editorial applauding “Intercept’s”
supposed successes in staunching the drug flow north, again citing questionable government
seizure stats as proof, while pointing out a “loophole” by which barbiturates and amphetamines
could still easily cross in pill form. Ignoring the public outcry from border communities, the
editorial concluded positively that “Operation “Intercept” should continue, therefore, and be
strengthened . . . Inconvenience to tourists has to be considered incidental.”152
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With “Intercept”, opinion articles also found grist for the culture wars simmering at the
time, employing the widely publicized government-provided figures of marijuana shortages to
satirize the youth culture of the late 1960s. A cartoon from the Los Angeles Times on October 1,
1969, portrayed a packed bar full of long-haired bearded hippies enjoying cocktails while
confused bartenders look on. One bartender explains the sudden rush of new customers to a
colleague, “It has something do with ‘Operation “Intercept”’ and their ‘supplies’ being cut
off!”153

Others played on similar themes. Another cartoon from the Ithaca Journal shows two
bell-bottomed young men wandering in the borderlands and finding a sombrero-clad Mexican
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with two large bags in hand. “Would you believe we’re from ‘Operation Intercept’ and we’re
confiscating that marijuana?” the desperate-looking hippies ask.154 While ostensibly poking fun
at drug-addled youth looking for a score, the cartoons point to how “Intercept”, and Nixon’s drug
war writ large, inflected on domestic politics and culture. By recasting the drug problem as a
foreign-born disease, domestic culture warriors used “Intercept” as a wedge issue to associate
drug use among American youth with “foreign dangers” and bolster an antidrug national identity.

Reports from the borderlands, however, questioned both “Intercept” and this national
identity as border cities bore the brunt of “Intercept’s” heavy-handed tactics. Renowned Los
Angeles Times journalist Ruben Salazar offered a perspective of both sides of the border while
reporting on “Intercept” from Calexico and Mexicali, two sister cities on the California-Mexico
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border. Salazar notes that some on the U.S. side supported “Intercept” while others on the
Mexican side viewed it as an “insult to Mexico.” Yet nearly everyone in these codependent
cities felt the visceral effect of the inspections in some form or another, with one resident
likening the experience to living next to the Berlin Wall.155
There were many examples of the critiques. In Chula Vista, just across the border from
Tijuana, letters to the editor on October 5, 1969, showed readers defending and criticizing
“Intercept”, while nearly all complained about the long lines and poor execution by Customs
officials. The letters also demonstrate how communities appreciated the need to maintain
harmonious ties with the country’s neighbors. One writer chides the administration for
misunderstanding the symbiotic nature of the borderlands, even painting “Intercept” as friendly
to communists. “Our relations with Mexico are so strained,” by Operation “Intercept”, she
wrote, “the friendship between our two countries is threatened. This will make Castro, Mao, and
Russians very happy.”156
Mexican press reports, by contrast, offer a transnational perspective that unlike the U.S.
government, and much of the U.S. press, located the source of America’s drug problem not in
Mexico but in the United States. A daily independent paper from Guadalajara, El Informador,
regularly reported on “Intercept” during its three-week run. In its first report on “Intercept” on
September 22, 1969, an article quoted U.S. officials saying “the Mexican government had been
informed of all the details of the operation in advance” and noting that the hypervigilance at the
border likely will not stop drugs from being produced or smuggled into the U.S. and “will create
bigger problems for tourists and those travelling for work or pleasure.”157
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As “Intercept” dragged on, El Informador quoted Mexican officials’ dissatisfaction with
the U.S. policy in a critical article detailing President Diaz’s dinner with the astronauts entitled
“Happiness Tarnished by a Mistake.”158 Calling out Washington’s unilateral decision to impose
its drug policy on the Mexican government, articles from the Mexican press highlighted
“Intercept” as a violation of Mexican sovereignty and an insult to national pride.
When the U.S. finally agreed to talks on October 11 and relaxed “Intercept”, the Mexican
press touted the accord as a victory with the government winning the battle of wills with its
northern neighbor. The article quoted Mexican Foreign Minister Antonio Carrillo Flores, saying
that, “respect and dignity for Mexico was what concerned us most.”159 One article titled
“Mexican Opposition Successful, Moving Forward Both Countries Will Cooperation Against
Drugs” portrayed Mexico at the negotiating table on equal footing with the United States.160
In the first weeks of October 1969, more reports began to call for an immediate end to
“Intercept”. Speaking to the frustration of Latin American governments eager for a collaborative
relationship with the United States, an October 8 piece quoted a Mexican official’s disparaging
remark that the name of Amistad Dam should be “renamed to Dam Friendship.”161
A few days later, another New York Times editorial published October 10, the first day
U.S. officials met with Mexican counterparts in Washington D.C., entitled “An Operation to
Intercept” roundly criticized the Nixon administration for calling it a “massive political blunder.”
Notably, the editorial admonished the White House for political gamesmanship with “its
readiness to meet a domestic political need without regard for its hemisphere neighbors.” It also
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questioned Nixon’s drug war strategy in general noting, “Anyone familiar with the dimensions of
the problem—including the fact that marijuana grows in many parts of Mexico—knows that
neither “Operation Intercept” nor the Mexican Army’s “search and destroy” missions can halt
the traffic.”162
Nixon administration officials, with the President’s blessing, finally agreed to end
“Intercept” on October 11, 1969, after considerable pressure from the Mexican government,
Mexican businesses, and U.S. border communities. As they prepared a joint communique to halt
“Intercept” and rebrand it as Operation “Cooperation”, Deputy Treasury Secretary David
Kennedy sent a memo to White House aide John Ehrlichman citing a copy of the October 10
New York Times editorial as a concern. In the memo, he worried most about optics that the
Times article represented: “we foresee a real danger that it can and will be used to accuse the
administration of retreating, under Latin-American pressure, from its program to reduce the flow
of drugs into this country.”163 This exchange speaks to the White House’s major concern that
“Intercept” be understood by the public as the Nixon administration taking Mexico to task on
drugs, regardless of the results.
In exchange for the halt of total inspections on October 10, Mexico agreed to negotiate a
bilateral antinarcotics agreement in the coming months, rebranding Operation “Intercept” as
Operation “Cooperation”. On December 12, 1969, the Joint Working Group of U.S. and
Mexican delegations signed an accord that foundationally shifted both the level of collaboration
between the two countries on narcotics issues, and the Mexican government’s stance towards
more active interdiction efforts on its own soil.
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After “Intercept” folded and “Cooperation” began, press reports reflected on the border
seizure plan and offered divergent analyses. The AP published a full-page article on October 16
entitled “Operation “Intercept” Cuts Flow, Tests Smuggler’s Imagination.” The piece praised
the results of “Intercept’s” seizures, how it pressured the Mexican government to respond to the
drug issue, echoed source control ideology, and even expressed concern for “responsible
Mexicans” that their country may soon become drug-addicted like American youth.164
Border papers noted the significant economic toll on their communities while questioning
the viability of using the southern border as the primary weapon to combat drug abuse in the
United States. The Arizona Republic printed a detailed report putting economic damage at $32
million and citing the incongruity of customs’ seizure figures that didn’t add up, in the author’s
view.165 Reinforcing the cognitive dissonance between border residents and Washington, one
resident points the finger at overeager politicians for the suffering of his community saying,
“U.S.-Mexican residents were the [scape]goat. There’s no question about it.”166
Mexican press offered a different narrative in “Intercept’s” wake, touting the Mexican
government’s continued fight for Mexican dignity. During negotiations after “Intercept”, El
Informador reported in a story Minister Flores’ response to reporters’ questions about an
agreement with the U.S. on drugs. He said, “our government, not because of a promise made to
the United States, but for the Mexican people and their interests…will continue the fight against
dangerous drugs with greater intensity.”167
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The article, and Flores’ own words, however, run counter to the content and nature of the
antinarcotics agreement Mexico made under the duress of “Intercept”, an accord that ceded to
nearly all U.S. demands to impose a law-and-order style drug war in Mexico that Nixon so
desired early in his presidency. In a scathing opinion piece published in El Informador on
November 9, 1969, the Mexican author half-jokingly mocks “Intercept” remarking that it only
proves Mexican farmers are procuring marijuana that, according to its main clientele in the U.S.,
is “of very high quality.” While tongue-in-cheek—at one point arguing that a cabal of U.S.based marijuana growers must have been behind “Intercept”—the piece argues that the real issue
underlying the illicit drug trade is the insatiable demand of U.S. consumers that drive the drug
market in Mexico. And that this business relationship, the author wrote, would be unlikely to
stop anytime soon.168

Conclusion
U.S. press coverage of Operation “Intercept” highlights how journalists served to both to
promote and question Nixon’s war on drugs. As articles from AP, the UPI, and opinion pieces
during this period demonstrate, papers often reported questionable statistics provided by
government officials during “Intercept”, even parroting ideological viewpoints as best evidenced
by UPI’s article on California Governor Reagan’s support for “Intercept”. That Reagan would
later become president and retain both his antidrug bone fides and often loose relationship to
truthful statistics further highlights how print journalism promoted this media message in the
early days of Nixon’s drug war.

168

P. Lussa, “Charlas Sobremesa,” El Informador, Guadalajara, México, 9 Nov 1969.

80

Moreover, while many news articles doubted “Intercept’s” stated goal—to reduce drug
trafficking into the United States—and assumed ulterior and coercive motivations by the U.S.
government, few questioned the rationale or morality of using the southern border as a political
tool for both a foreign policy aim and domestic culture war politicking.
Reports from the border communities offer a juxtaposing perspective on U.S. national
identity in the context of the war on drugs. As scholars have noted, over many generations, sister
cities along the U.S.-Mexico border, such as Juarez and El Paso, have developed a shared
character that transcends clearly defined national identities of Mexican or American. In the
“borderlands,” issues of migration, trade, and even language blur into fluid concepts that
question national identity constructs and often put border cities at odds with state and national
governments located more inland.169
Despite growing up in Southern California only a few hours from Tijuana, Nixon, the
first modern president to effectively shut down the border, fundamentally misunderstood—or
chose to ignore—borderland identities when he used the U.S.-Mexico border as a political
bargaining tool. Papers from border cities more than any other both understood the challenges of
drug smuggling and chastised the administration for using the border to achieve its foreign and
domestic policy aims, blaming a disconnected Washington consensus forever deaf to the
concerns of borderlands.
The countervailing perspective of the Mexican press contrasts markedly with the
domestic policy focus prevalent in U.S. press coverage of “Intercept”. Mexican journalists gave
voice to the border cities in Mexico whose business and livelihood suffered under “Intercept”,
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while also highlighting the tendency for Americans to turn a blind eye towards the issue of
demand and its consequences south of the border. As scholars have pointed out, Mexican
journalism in the late 1960s remained firmly under the influence of the state dominated by the
PRI political party. This state-supportive media infrastructure likely accounts for the positive
spin on Mexican officials’ claims of “victory” in shutting down “Intercept”, and the focus on
issues of national sovereignty and respect for the Mexican government vis a vis the United
States.170 Yet as reports from both sides of the border like those of Ruben Salazar demonstrate,
concerns of dignity and national pride also resonated with many ordinary Mexicans frustrated by
“Intercept’s” heavy-handed inspections.
A review of print media during the fall of 1969 shows that while debates about drugs
continued apace in both mainstream and American counterculture, U.S. press reports often
promoted the administration’s supply control, drugs-as-disease worldview. While smaller border
papers and the Mexican press offered divergent perspectives, few major U.S. publications
questioned Nixon’s reframing of the drug problem as a “foreign danger.” This realignment, as
the preceding chapter of this paper explained, placed the orthodoxy of drug supply control
rhetorically in line with anticommunism, a link that remained during and after the Cold War.
Viewing Nixon’s drug policy through a domestic lens, print media during the few months
of “Intercept” in the fall of 1969 often helped to perpetuate a U.S.-led foreign drug war that
Nixon set in motion. As the final chapter will discuss, Nixon’s supply control ideology
prioritizing “foreign dangers” over domestic public health solutions has persisted for decades
within the U.S. foreign policy establishment well after the end of the Cold War, with
questionable outcomes in the United States and abroad.
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Chapter 4
Operation “Intercept”, The Merida Accords, and the Legacy of Nixon’s Drug War
When Mexican President Felipe Calderón declared war on Mexico’s drug cartels in 2006,
the message from across the border was loud and clear: take action to prevent illicit drug
trafficking and U.S. funding and resources will follow.171 A year later, Mexico and the United
States signed the Merida Accords. This multi-billion-dollar aid agreement provided U.S.
military equipment, training, and logistical support to Mexican law enforcement, reinvigorating
the supply-reduction ideology that for over half a century has dominated and continues to
undergird U.S. international drug policy.
Yet more than a decade after the Merida Accords, the flow of illicit drugs into the United
States continues unabated. Meanwhile, homicides in Mexico have more than tripled due in large
part to the militarized cartel war begun during the Calderon administration.172 In 2018, the
staggering rise of drug overdoses from fentanyl and other illegal drugs crossing the border
reduced U.S. life expectancy for the first time since the Second World War.173 According to the
Drug Enforcement Agency’s annual reports, opioids and other illegal drugs remain readily
available in the illicit market.174 In the face of these sobering statistics, few could argue that the
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U.S. government’s drug policy towards Mexico has succeeded in reducing crime or drug abuse
in the United States.
The joint declaration of war on drug traffickers in Mexico in 2007, fueled by U.S.
military aid and law enforcement techniques, has precedent with U.S. President Richard Nixon’s
drug policy response three decades earlier. Nixon’s infamous “war on drugs,” born out of his
law-and-order 1968 presidential campaign, refocused the U.S. federal bureaucracy on a supplyreduction ethos that envisaged malign foreign actors seeking to undermine “traditional”
American values by infecting Americans with dangerous narcotics.
As Chapter 1 of this thesis describes, in its first act to fight illicit drug trafficking, the
Nixon administration implemented Operation “Intercept”, shuttering the U.S.-Mexico border in
September 1969 to coerce Mexican government action on drug trafficking.175 Nixon, however,
took this policy stance one step further when he declared drugs “public enemy number one” in a
Special Message to the Congress on Drug Abuse Prevention and Control on June 17, 1971, to
Congress. Nixon’s source control-based drug strategy formed the basis for expanded federal
powers to combat the drug threat, both at home and abroad.176 Critically, Nixon-era policies
towards so-called “drug supply nations,” particularly in Latin America, tied U.S. economic aid
and other federal assistance to foreign governments’ collaboration in the U.S. supply-side drug
war strategy. In other words, much like the Merida Accords, securing U.S. foreign aid to build
schools or buy vaccines required sprayed marijuana fields and incarcerated drug kingpins.177
In the public consciousness, however, it was President Ronald Reagan who declared war
on drugs when he cited them as a national security threat in 1982. First Lady Nancy Reagan’s
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public “Just Say No” campaign broadcast on television screens and public schools around the
country in the early 1980s impressed upon a nation a domesticized and individualized anti-drug
national identity that became part of 1980s popular culture.
Meanwhile, President Reagan pursued an international drug war to unprecedented levels
of foreign intervention, especially in source countries like Colombia and Mexico. With the rise
of crack cocaine in the early 1980s and the Reagan administration’s militarization of the drug
war both domestically and internationally, public perception of the war on drugs often tacks
towards the 1980s as the genesis for America’s foreign-focused drug policy driven by source
reduction ideology abroad and punitive law enforcement at home.178
Although the U.S. entered a new phase of foreign interventionism in the drug control
effort in the early 1980s, Reagan’s policies were hardly new. His relatively recent predecessor,
Nixon, had made illegal drugs a central part of his political platform. Nixon’s antidrug
legislative legacy and foreign interventionist approach to drug control formed the basis for much
of the drug policy that came after, especially in the 1980s. In Nixon’s June 1971 speech, he
defined the global scope of the U.S. new policy to curb illegal drugs, stating: “The problem is
national and international. We are moving to deal with it on both levels.”179 Nixon notably
targeted Mexico as his opening act in the drug war through Operation “Intercept” and used the
full weight of the executive branch to compel the Mexican government to adopt a new drug
worldview centered around a U.S. domestic political agenda that saw drugs, and their source
countries, as “foreign dangers.”
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Scholarship deciphering the history of U.S. drug control policy often mentions Operation
“Intercept” as a minor incident in the context of a larger drug policy story, or an ill-advised
policy tussle unique to the dynamics of a shared border that resulted in few tangible changes to
U.S. foreign policy. While a small number of journal articles and a summary of declassified
government documents by Kate Doyle at George Washington University’s National Security
Archive (from which this paper draws considerably), a historical monograph does not yet exist
that focuses on Operations “Intercept”, Operation “Cooperation”, and U.S.-Mexico drug policy
during Nixon’s first term.180 However, Operation “Intercept” planted the flag that
conceptualized a new drug war ideology with significant consequences for Mexico, the United
States, and other Latin American nations.
On the national front, by refocusing the drug problem on foreign actors like Mexico, the
Nixon White House laid the groundwork for the subsequent omnibus bill that Nixon proposed,
the 1970 Comprehensive Drug Abuse and Prevention Act. The Act contained within it the more
well-known Controlled Substances Act that, as one drug scholar put it, “with the stroke of a pen,
completely transformed the landscape of U.S. drug control,” both domestically and abroad.181
The bill established drug schedules putting heroin and marijuana – two drugs with considerably
different impacts on users, yet notably both produced primarily outside of the United States – in
the same category. The law also expanded the authorities of federal law enforcement including
the heavy-handed “no knock” warrants for domestic drug arrests, and increased minimum
sentencing for suspected dealers and traffickers for carrying even small amounts of illegal
drugs.182
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Internationally, Nixon ratcheted up the drug war. In April 1970, he doubled the number
of U.S. drug agents assigned overseas putting enforcement officials in twenty embassies and
consulates in seventeen countries to prioritize source control efforts with host nations.183 A year
later, the Nixon administration supported the Foreign Assistance Act of 1971 that ceded the
executive branch power to withhold U.S. foreign aid to any nation the president noted failed to
adequately counter illegal drug production and trafficking within its borders. As discussed in
Chapter 2, by codifying antidrug policy into the national security firmament, the president and
Congress realigned source control ideology with Cold War priorities.184
Through unilateral action Operation “Cooperation” forced Mexico to acquiesce to
Washington’s vision of fighting the drug war by attacking the source to stem the flow of illegal
drugs into the United States. The results validated the viewpoint that supply and transit nations
should bear the burden of eradicating illicit drug production and trafficking by using state power
through law enforcement. It also endorsed, in the view of administration officials, the value of
coercive international diplomacy tactics to meet these aims.
Sixty years later, the tactic of aerial bombardment to attack the source of drugs outside
the United States – with or without host government cooperation – still finds resonance within
the highest ranks of the U.S. government. In the summer of 2020, President Donald Trump,
concerned about the increasing amounts of illegal drugs crossing the southern border, asked then
Secretary of Defense Mark Esper why the United States military could not simply launch
missiles into Mexico to “destroy the drug labs.” Trump’s disparaging comments that the
Mexican government did not “have control of their own country,” questioned whether the United
States was required to respect Mexican sovereignty regarding drug control. While Trump denied
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Secretary Esper’s account, Trump’s remarks mirror the tortured rhetoric of Nixon’s “special
relationship” towards Mexico. Like Nixon, Trump favored coercion over collaboration on the
drug problem, and embraced a unilateral worldview most blatantly expressed in 1969 with
Operation “Intercept”.185
Operation “Cooperation”, the 1970 result of bilateral negotiations after “Intercept”, went
further by integrating U.S. government funding and resources into Mexico’s law enforcement
institutions under the rubric of source control. With the Mexican government’s acquiescence,
U.S. technology, know-how, and human capital supported local interdiction efforts on Mexican
soil. The agreement provided U.S. funds, training, and airpower to aid Mexican authorities in
implementing the first aerial crop eradication campaign for the poppy plant used to make heroin:
Operation “Condor.”186
Aerial eradication programs modeled on Mexico’s became the preferred solution in the
U.S. foreign drug policy toolkit for other regional partners including Colombia, Peru, and
Bolivia during the ensuing decades. Critically, for the so-called “drug supply nations” in Latin
America, U.S. economic aid and other forms of assistance would thereafter hinge on foreign
governments’ cooperation with Washington’s supply-side drug war strategy.187
As scholarship has shown, despite the flawed logic of the U.S. government’s source
control approach, the fundamentals of its drug foreign policy have not truly evolved.188 Thirty
years after the United States launched the defoliation program Operation Condor in 1975 to
counter Mexico’s domestic poppy and marijuana production, in 2007 Mexico and the United
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States signed the Merida Initiative. Plan Mexico, as the program became known, followed Plan
Colombia, the initiative created under President Bill Clinton to stem the flow of Andean coca
into the United States and attack the leftist guerrillas tied to the drug trade. Both drug
interdiction plans, supported by both Democratic and Republican administrations, built upon the
same supply control logic Nixon espoused. An expanded version of Operation “Cooperation”,
Plan Mexico’s $3 billion bilateral aid program promised helicopters, planes, surveillance
equipment, and institution-building programs for Mexican law enforcement and judicial
systems.189
Fifteen years later, results remain mixed. According to the DEA’s 2020 National Drug
Threat Assessment, the majority of illegal drugs trafficked into the United States still transit
through Mexico including heroin and fentanyl that the DEA report states are both “readily
available across the country.”190 Over half of a million Americans have died from an epidemic
of opioid overdoses during the last two decades spurred by both lax regulation of the U.S.
pharmaceutical industry and an increase in the amount and lethality of illicit opioids entering the
country. These morbid figures highlight the failure of drug foreign policy past and present to
meet Nixon’s 1968 goal to stop drugs from “decimating” American citizens’ lives.191
Much like the Nixon administration’s rebrand of “Intercept” to “Cooperation”, the
Merida initiative’s rework under the new Bicentennial Framework maintains much of the supply
control infrastructure intact. This throughline suggests drug source control ideology still
resonates strongly within the U.S. government foreign policy establishment, even while the ends
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have rarely lined up with the means.192 Three decades after the end of the Cold War, twenty-first
century U.S. foreign policy on narcotics still reflects the drugs as “foreign dangers” worldview
that Operation “Intercept” manifested in 1969, and undergirds U.S. and Mexico bilateral
relations through to the present day with similarly destructive outcomes on both sides of the
border.
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